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Abstract 
Central to this research is an analytical discussion of the motives and implications of the 
European Union and Norwegian human rights and democracy policies towards Zimbabwe.  In 
discussing this it is vital to understand the human rights and land histories of Zimbabwe. It is 
equally significant to understand that relations between Zimbabwe and Norway and the 
European Union go a long way back.  Zimbabwe is currently facing challenges related to 
deficits in human rights and democracy. How can one best understand such challenges in 
Zimbabwe?  It is worth to note that the challenges in Zimbabwe should be understood in a 
historical context of the land and human rights pasts. In the colonial Zimbabwe land was 
racially divided and the human rights of other sections of her population were more important 
than other groups in the same country. The situation was almost the same as in South Africa`s 
apartheid system. Knowing that this is part of what explains today`s agonies in Zimbabwe is 
critical in facing the challenges the country has today.  The post colonial administrators in the 
country exploit such a history as a political tool to prolong their rule. The consequence has 
been that human rights and democracy have suffered. Where do The EU and Norway come 
in? 
Do the EU and Norway have genuine intentions to promote democracy and human rights in 
Zimbabwe? This book discusses the human rights policies of the EU and Norway towards 
Zimbabwe. Both the EU and Norway seem to have toughened their stance on Zimbabwe from 
the year 2000 after the country embarked on the land reform programme. They both imposed 
sanctions and financial restrictions against Zimbabwe in the name of promoting good 
governance. To push for the agenda to promote human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe 
both EU and Norway have partnered with NGOs to pressure and expose the administration in 
Zimbabwe. What are the motives for so doing? This work asks why the EU and Norway did 
not demand the government of Zimbabwe to make sure that all people in the country must 
have equal access to arable land soon after independence in 1980. It also poses the question of 
why did the EU and Norway not significantly condemn the loss of life in the period between 
1981to 1987 in Zimbabwe. And why are they condemning the post 2000 era and not all the 
eras before then? Is it that the EU and Norway are interested in promoting their self economic 
and strategic interests at the expense of genuine human rights in Zimbabwe? This research 
work argues that such a possibility is a legitimate explanation of the motives of the EU and 
Norway in Zimbabwe? This is all about international realism and the desire by stronger 
nations to dominate the weaker states.  Can this justify the suffocating human rights set up in 
Zimbabwe today? Definitely not, argues the essay.  
Weaknesses in the EU and Norwegian human rights policies towards Zimbabwe have helped 
the Zimbabwean government to hang on to power despite some objections from a major 
section of its population. By imposing sanctions, the EU has been accused by the government 
of being itself responsible for the economic downturns in the country. The EU has failed to 
send a clear and consistent message that land is a key factor in tackling the human rights and 
democracy issues in Zimbabwe. By failing to do so, the Zimbabwe authorities have been 
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quick to appeal to fellow African nations to help defend Zimbabwe from imperial motives of 
the EU and Norway alike.   
Do the EU and Norway have genuine motives to help Zimbabwe? Indeed this work also 
argues that both Norway and the EU see Zimbabwe as platform to promote the western values 
of fairness, freedom, democracy and the respect for human rights. Most of these basic things 
are lacking in Zimbabwe today. Where does the EU and Norway differ? The essay argues that 
whilst Norway advocates for dialogue and engagement to tackle the human rights challenges 
in Zimbabwe, the EU`s position is much tougher. The Norwegian approach towards 
Zimbabwe can therefore be critical in influencing the EU and Zimbabwe to resolve their 
differences and consequently help in the democratization process in Zimbabwe.   That both 
the EU and Norway have genuine intentions for the situation in Zimbabwe to be democratic 
has been underlined in this discussion and it will remain so.  
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CHAPTER I 
 On the Research, Theory and Methodology - An Introduction 
Significance of this research topic 
At this particular era, most mentions of the name Zimbabwe provokes mixed feelings 
of a successful story gone wrong. For some Zimbabwe represents all that needs to be 
done in the reconfiguration of meandered colonial pasts. To most of the western 
European nations, Zimbabwe represents a test of foreign policy directions. For most 
African nations as well as the so called third world nations, this country portrays a 
story of good, courage and excesses.  The cross cutting influence of Zimbabwe`s 
situation to the contemporary global regimes makes it a significant case for research. 
Entertainment is not what defines the significance of this case study; rather it is its far 
reaching implications for development and foreign policy lessons that shape it into a 
truly relevant study area. Links between Europe and African nations have been long, 
fruitful and sometimes antagonistic. One of the most controversial and influential links 
has recently been the relations between Europe and Zimbabwe. This relation has 
reinvigorated the desire for a proper understanding of what really shapes the European 
interests in African governance systems. It has begged the question of whether Europe 
is really interested in assisting Africa to develop or whether it is after its own self 
interests. Recent events in Zimbabwe have provided an opportunity to revitalize this 
debate using Zimbabwe itself as case study. It has been the vociferous reactions to 
Zimbabwe`s events from the European Union and sister nations like Norway under the 
banner of human rights that attracts research interest on what is behind the European 
motives on Zimbabwe. In recent years big events like the Europe-Africa summit were 
cancelled based on the different policy positions between European and African 
nations on Zimbabwe`s situation. Furthermore relations of the recent past between 
France, Portugal and the United Kingdom have been shaken by their sometimes 
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differing positions on the way forward on Zimbabwe. When Sweden took over the EU 
presidency in 2009 its suggestions on dealing with Zimbabwe sparked some arguments 
within the EU on Zimbabwe. Relational complexities within the EU and between the 
EU and Africa have sometimes largely been caused by the perceived volatile 
governance system in Zimbabwe.  Bad governance is not limited to Zimbabwe; rather 
it is widespread among all nations of the globe. The interest that the perceived bad 
governance in Zimbabwe has attracted from the EU and western nations and others is 
what makes it even more vital to do a research that endeavors to dig the motives 
behind the human rights and democracy policies of the EU and Norway towards 
Zimbabwe. This is what this research is designed to undertake. 
Research question: 
What are the motives and implications of the EU and Norwegian human rights and 
democracy policies towards Zimbabwe?   
a. Is the EU and Norway interested in preserving their self interests in Zimbabwe 
or in promoting genuine human rights and democracy 
b. What are the implications for such motives 
Research Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The EU and Norway are interested in promoting their self interests in 
Zimbabwe. 
Hypothesis 2:  The EU and Norway are interested not just in self interests but also in 
promoting genuine democracy in Zimbabwe. 
Research Objectives 
Central to the objective of this research is an endeavor to analyze the motives behind 
the EU and Norwegian human rights and democracy policies towards Zimbabwe. As a 
consequence the research will analyze the implications of the EU and Norwegian 
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policies towards Zimbabwe. The objective of this paper is to ask and analyze whether 
the EU and Norway are pursuing self interests in Zimbabwe or whether they are 
interested in genuinely promoting democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. The 
potential differences between Norwegian and EU motives will be analyzed. 
Justification for the Research: 
I justify the necessity of such a research based on a number of issues. I believe that the 
Zimbabwean case is a test case for the current and future EU-Africa relations in many 
ways. The success or failure of the Zimbabwean actions will be a roadmap for former 
settler colonies in Africa to follow. Hypothetically, the African nations are using 
Zimbabwe as a traffic robot to test the probable implications of certain policy 
directions in certain policy areas rooted in center-periphery politicking. Hence this 
kind of research will try to make a genuine empirical and academic display that 
Norway and the EU needs additional information on this area. The struggle for peace 
and democracy in Zimbabwe is deeply rooted on the colonial and post-colonial 
democratic related complexities that this project seeks to merge into the analysis of the 
EU and Norwegian human rights policies. Norway, EU and Zimbabwe need to 
understand each other better. They need to know what lies behind the way they relate 
in an effort to improve corporation between them. It is hoped this research will help 
build that platform for further understanding between these nations.   
Methodology 
Researching on political issues poses some dilemmas in terms of choice of  research 
methods. Nevertheless in a typical social scientific research such as the one which is 
the basis of this paper, it was prudent to employ the qualitative approach. Qualitative 
methods generally refer to several distinctive research activities: participant 
observation, intensive/in depth interviewing, and focus group discussions (Chambliss 
Daniel F et al, 166: 2006). In this paper the interviewing technique was the more 
dominant method employed. The decision not to employ other methods was based 
sorely on their inappropriateness to the type of research I was undertaking.  As 
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Silverman noted, no method of research, quantitative or qualitative, is intrinsically 
better than any other (David Silverman, 6: 2005). He goes on to note that there are no 
wrong or right methods- there are only methods that are appropriate to your research 
topic and the model with which you are working. (David Silverman, 112: 2005). In my 
case it was the qualitative method which was better placed to answer my research 
question of what are the policy motives of the EU and the Norwegian state towards 
Zimbabwe`s human rights situation. Chambliss noted the salience of qualitative 
methods by stating that qualitative research aims to go where people live and thereby 
become at its best form, a form of literature, beautifully teaching its readers the deeper 
truths of the human condition. (Chambliss Daniel F et al, 188: 2006). In as much as 
this might hold value it does not however discard the possibilities within other 
methods. With a great deal of time it will be possible to carry out a mixed quantitative 
and qualitative methodology if one wishes to expand the scope of the research on the 
relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the European Union.  This is a possibility 
left to future research gaps on this area.  Within the family of qualitative research I 
decided to focus specifically on employing the interview method, the historical method 
and the comparative approach which will be explained briefly below. These methods 
are suited to argument each other and in trying to put the study and research questions 
into context and understandability.  
Personal in-depth interview techniques  
One of the most widely tried and tested research methods is the interviewing 
technique. Interviews have been a traditional social scientific and anthropological 
approach in undertaking social and political science research. Their traditionality 
seems to endure the test of times. In this paper interviewing formed a great deal of the 
methodology as it sought to probe and get an understanding of what lies behind the 
conduct of relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the EU. This is what Rubin and 
Rubin noted regarding the use of intensive interviews: “Often we wonder what 
individuals think or feel, or how they see their world. For this purpose one can use 
intensive interviews or in-depth interviewing which relies on open-ended questions to 
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develop a comprehensive picture of the interviewee`s background, attitudes, and 
actions- to listen to people as they describe how they  understand the worlds in which 
they live and work”. (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:3 in Chambliss et al, 180: 2006). My 
research approach followed this thinking in that  my questions were open ended and 
designed to solicit relevant responses to what the research questions needed to 
uncover. Intensive interviewing is a technique which is sometimes referred to as in-
depth interviews or unstructured interviews. Intensive interview is employed by 
Lofland and Lofland (1995) as alternative to the term unstructured interview and 
Spradley uses the term ethnographic interview to describe a form of interview that is 
more or less synonymous with the unstructured interview. (Bryman Allan, 113: 2008).  
In an unstructured interview the interviewer typically has only a list of topics or issues, 
often called an interview guide or aide memoire, that are typically covered and the 
style of questioning is typically informal and the phrasing and sequencing of questions 
will vary form interview to interview (Bryman Allan, 113: 2008).  In this paper these 
approaches were employed. It was felt that having an unstructured interview will 
produce better results for the research.  It was possible to get in depth information by 
asking a question like “why do you think Norway promotes human rights in 
Zimbabwe” or “why do you think the EU ties aid to human rights in Zimbabwe”. 
These questions will give the respondent reasonable space to explore various 
possibilities and by so doing it was possible to get a lot of information on a variety of 
issues regarding the research questions. In one of my previous researches I noted that 
open ended interviews gives room to obtain insights beyond one question only but into 
other variables which the research seeks to investigate. (Marambanyika Ocean, 6: 
2008). It was thus found appropriate to use open ended in-depth interviews in this 
research based on the great possibilities it had to offer in terms of answering the 
research questions. 
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In depth Telephone Interviewing  
Telephone interviewing was one of the methods employed in this research. I chose this 
method based on the geographic spacing of the informants I wanted to reach. Besides, 
this method is convenient in terms of costs and time management.  Thus Allan Bryman 
pointed out that the advantage of telephone interviews over personal interviews are 
that on a like for like basis they are far cheaper and also quicker to administer 
especially if the sample is geographically dispersed. (Bryman Allan, 115: 2008). 
Historical method 
As an attempt to set the research into context this paper employed the historical 
method approach. Using history makes it possible to introduce the case area in a way 
that readers will make sense of where the research is coming and going. In this case 
the historical method makes it possible for readers to have a brief background of the 
historical relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the European Union. It also 
makes it possible to have a historical overview of the human rights situation in 
Zimbabwe and the general history of the European Union foreign policy which will 
provide the basis to analyze the theme of the research. Pointing out the significance of 
history in research,  Acton in his work of October 1896 to the syndics of the 
Cambridge University Press on the work which he had undertaken to edit implied 
history to be  a unique opportunity of recording, in the most useful to the greatest 
number, the fullness of the knowledge which the 19
th
 century was about to offer, (Carr 
Edward Hallet,1 : 1962), whilst Carr noted that  history consists of a corpus of 
ascertained facts and the facts are available to the historian on documents, inscriptions 
and the historian collects them , cooks them and serves them (Carr Edward Hallet ,6 : 
1962). In the 1830s, Ranke remarked that the task of the historian was “simply to show 
how it really was (Carr Edward Hallet, 6: 1962). In summary terms using history in 
research is crucial part of making the research understandable and setting it into 
context. Thus the decision to employ this method was partly based on this premise.   
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The case study and Comparative method 
In this research the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe have been chosen as cases for the 
study. Zimbabwe is specifically the point case on which the EU and Norwegian 
policies will be analyzed. On the other hand it can be noted that the EU and Norway 
are cases that will some how end up being compared. Though it is not a bigger 
intention of the research to compare and contrast the EU and Norwegian policies, it 
will be inevitable to deliberate on the similarities and differences between the 
Norwegian and the EU approaches in dealing with the human rights situation in 
Zimbabwe. Thus a comparative analysis approach is very important in social science 
research. Charles Ragin thus pointed out that comparison provides a basis for making 
statements about empirical regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases 
relative to substantive and theoretical criteria, (Ragin Charles C, 1: 1987). In an 
attempt to note the significance of comparative research Swanson went to the near 
extremes by highlighting that   “thinking without comparison in unthinkable. And, in 
the absence of comparison, so is all thought and scientific research” (Swanson 
1971:145 in Ragin C, 1: 1987).  In the analytical sections of the paper it will be noted 
that the comparative aspect will feature reasonably were necessary.  
Secondary Methods 
Central to the research methods for this paper was the use of secondary data. This 
entailed references to published articles, books, electronic data and other related 
secondary literature. Secondary literature forms part of the body of sources that will be 
amalgamated with the primary interview data to inform the analysis in this paper. In 
fact most arguments in this research will build on information available through 
published works and then attempt to bridge the knowledge gap by merging the 
secondary and primary data analysis.  
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Purposive and theoretical sampling 
Part of the challenges in interview research is the sampling part of the deal. It is a 
challenge to come up with a list of informants who might be representative of the 
questions the research intends to answer. In this research I employed the purposive 
sampling approach which is described by Bryman as  essentially strategic and entails 
an attempt to establish a good correspondence between research questions and 
sampling- in other words, the researcher samples on the basis of wanting to interview 
people who are relevant to the research. (Bryman Allan, 333-34: 2008). This approach 
partly resemble my approach in this research as I deliberately chose to interview 
informants I thought have relevant knowledge on the foreign and human rights 
relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the European Union.  On theoretical 
sampling approach, Bryman noted that it entails sampling interviewees until your 
categories achieve saturation and selecting further interviewees on the basis of your 
emerging theoretical focus (Bryman Allan, 334: 2008). Regarding the theoretical 
sampling I was choosing some of my informants based on some issues that emerged 
from a previous interview but strictly related to my research.   Thus the sampling was 
a mixture of purposive and theoretical sampling and in this case the distinction 
between these two was blurred.  
The research sample:  
The following are the informants conducted for the research: 
The former Prime Minister of Norway and President of the Oslo Center for Peace and 
Human Rights, Kjell Magne Bondevik- He was the Prime Minister of Norway from 
1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005. He is the longest serving non-Socialist Prime 
Minister in Norway since 1945. He is now the President of the Oslo Center for Peace 
and Human Rights which is located in Norway. I scheduled an interview with Mr. 
Bondevik via Tone Holme who is the Administrative Secretary at the Oslo Center. The 
interview took place on 25 March 2010 at the main Oslo Center offices. It was 
purposely and rightly thought that Mr. Bondevik has a wide range of knowledge to 
discuss the Norwegian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe and the possible 
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motives behind such policies. Hence the decision to have Mr. Bondevik as a vital 
informant was based on this approach. 
A university academic on history and human rights in Zimbabwe Sabelo Gatsheni 
Ndlovu – He was a lecturer of African History at the Midlands State University in 
Zimbabwe and a lecturer at the Ferguson School of African and Oriental Studies at 
Oxford University in the United Kingdom and he wrote a number of articles in 
Journals of African Studies. He has written a number of books on the History of 
Zimbabwe alongside Zimbabwean experts like Terrence Ranger. At the time of the 
interview he was planning to join the South African Institute of International Affairs.  
As it turned out to be, it was correct decision to conduct Doctor Gathseni for a 
discussion on the EU and Scandinavian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. It 
was thus deliberate to ask Dr. Ndlovu for his contribution as he turned out to be very 
valuable on the subject as well as being partly representative of the coalition 
government`s position on the EU and Norwegian policy towards Zimbabwe.  
A former active member of the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) - 
Victor Chimhutu- Like in many other countries, the student movement is a very 
influential political force in Zimbabwe. In fact the largest opposition political party 
before the coalition government in Zimbabwe was a conglomeration of labor and 
student movements. Victor Chimhutu was a student activist in the Zimbabwe National 
Students Union between 2000 and 2006. He studied a Psychology and Public 
Administration at the University of Zimbabwe and is currently studying for a Master 
in Gender in Development at the University of Bergen in Norway. The decision to 
make him part of the informants was based on the perception that his views might be 
partly representative of this branch of society in Zimbabwe.   
An Academic researcher at the European research center at the University of Oslo 
(ARENA), Marianne Ridevold - Marianne is PhD fellow at the center for European 
research and she provided a general discussion on the EU make up. Though the 
discussion with her was not necessarily on EU- Zimbabwe relations, it provided a 
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basis to understand the dynamics of policy making within the EU which is relevant in 
writing of issues related to the European Union. 
Former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
emergency relief Coordinator and current director of the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI), Jan Egeland - I conducted Mr. Egeland via his personal 
secretary and she notified me that he was having a busy schedule. I had earlier 
personally talked to Mr. Egeland when we met at a local conference in Oslo and he 
had indicated that he will be willing to discuss Zimbabwe with me when my research 
begins. I was however content with having received a free copy of a chapter written 
about his previous meeting with President Mugabe in a book entitled “a billion lives”.  
His thoughts in that chapter will be helpful in giving a bird’s eye view on perceptions 
of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. 
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Utenriksdepartementet) - I tried to conduct the 
Africa or Zimbabwe section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and they 
gave me links to their website which they thought can be usable for my research 
questions. I intend therefore to analyze and utilize the information on their website in 
the paper.   
Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary General and Nobel Peace Prize Winner. 
I had a brief discussion with Kofi Annan during an international meeting in Oslo in 
February 2009. I intend to refer to his thoughts on the subject under research. 
Wangari Mathai, the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Winner and a Kenyan Environmental 
activist. She was a deputy Minister of Environment and Natural Resources in Kenya 
between 2003 and 2005. . I met her at the World Environmental Day celebrations in 
June 2007 in Tromsø, Norway. I intend to refer to her thoughts on human rights in 
Zimbabwe.  
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Methods and research validity  
The methods chosen for the study were designed to provide a high degree of validity 
in responding to the research questions. Validity is concerned with whether a variable 
measures what it is intended to measure (Bollen 1989:184 in Adcock Robert and 
Collier David, 530:2001). Further Adcock and Collier notes that measurement validity 
is specifically concerned with whether operationalisation and scoring of cases 
adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure (Adcock Robert and 
Collier David, 529: 2001). The variables chosen as tools of analysis in this paper 
ensure reliability and validity of the research outcome. The outlined methods were 
thus premised to correlate with the research questions and variables like sanctions and 
human rights are tools in EU and Norwegian foreign policies towards Zimbabwe that 
will make it possible to analyze the motives and implications of such political 
approaches.    
Research challenges  
The research process has not been without challenges. One of the sizeable challenges 
has been at a personal level as a researcher. Having grown up in one of the most 
politically volatile periods in post independence Zimbabwe fraught with political 
propagandas from the competing political parties, it required enormous energy to 
maintain political objectivity.  My everyday life in Zimbabwe was a time in which the 
media and information channels were controlled by the state. In the last decade the 
state controlled media had been at pains to portray many western policies as neo 
colonial. This poses a challenge in social research which discusses relations between a 
developing nation like Zimbabwe and western blocs like the EU and Norway. 
However this challenge has been overcome through my long years studying issues of 
governance, development, conflict and objectivity in social scientific research. Despite 
having spent a great deal living in an environment of hostile relations between EU and 
Zimbabwe, I find great pleasure in sticking to ethics of research objectivity as a way of 
fighting off this challenge.  
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Challenges in reaching informants in far away places led me to use the telephone 
interviewing techniques. Discussing the issue of Zimbabwe-EU relations is in itself a 
very sensitive issue in Zimbabwe. This applies when it comes to getting political 
leaders to sit down and openly discuss political issues. It is even a challenge for the 
people inside Zimbabwe to accept to openly discuss the government in a negative way 
with researchers. This has been partly as a result of the political violence experienced 
in the last decade or so which made people suspicious of political issues. However 
there are still some in the academic and political movements who are willing to discuss 
politics. This necessitated my decision to have informants from the academia and 
student movements from Zimbabwe as they find it relatively agreeable to discuss their 
thoughts on politics in Zimbabwe. By so doing I attempted to overcome challenges of 
getting respondents to talk politics in Zimbabwe. For some it might not sound too 
political to discuss the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe, but as a result of the political 
propaganda in Zimbabwe, the EU is a big political issue because of the significance of 
its influence in the country.  
Ethical framework  
Most of my informants were people involved in politics and academics and as such 
there was no big issue regarding anonymity. Most of the informants had no objections 
to being mentioned as who they are in the paper`s analysis.  I promised to make 
available the final product of my research to some of the respondents and i intend to do 
as such.   
Literature review 
Works that are devoted to the analysis of the motives and implications of the European 
Union and Norwegian human rights policies on Zimbabwe have been scant.  Available 
literature on corporation between Zimbabwe and the EU have generally been located 
with the general analysis of relations between the EU and Africa as stipulated under 
the Lome Convention and the successor  Cotonou Agreement.  The Norwegian 
academic interest on the subject of Zimbabwe has been relatively limited when 
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compared to the areas like West Africa, East Africa and South Africa. The Norwegian 
academic and development corporation interests have of late been largely focused on 
countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia, Botswana, Zambia and Ghana. This can partly 
explain the relatively low focus on analyzing Norwegian Zimbabwe relations. The 
deteriorating political climate in Zimbabwe may also have been a factor in limiting 
academic research on Zimbabwe. Yet despite the reduced academic involvement on 
Norwegian Zimbabwe relations, the significance of Zimbabwe in impacting the 
relations between Africa and the western European nations has even increased. Hence 
the need to do more on this area as this paper seeks to do.  
As the European commission director general for information noted, the rights and 
obligations flowing from the Lome convention and its successors have dominated 
Zimbabwe`s partnership with the EU. (European Commission report, 2: 1997). The 
report goes on to mention development and humanitarian assistance that the EU has 
been supplying to Zimbabwe. The information in the EU reports is significant for 
research on EU development assistance to Zimbabwe. However the data in the reports 
is shy on going towards an empirical analysis of the motives and implications of the 
EU human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. This paper seeks therefore to build on this 
data to analyze the utilization of this development assistance as a human rights policy 
with some possible motives behind it. On its website the European delegation in 
Zimbabwe remarks that “the European Commission (EC) actively supports the 
promotion of governance, democratization and human rights in Zimbabwe” and that 
the EC is also cooperating with different types of Zimbabwean Non State Actors 
(NSAs) in constituting a more democratic Zimbabwean society (delzwe.ec.europa.eu).  
This information is very important for researches on Zimbabwe though in itself this 
available information from the EU lacks the academic analysis of the whole social 
scientific agenda behind the chosen relational approaches between EU and Zimbabwe. 
This research attempts to build on such data in making an analysis of the realist and 
rationalist intentions of the EU towards Zimbabwe.  
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In a book entitled The EU and Africa: The restructuring on north-south relations 
William Brown pointed out that the Lome relations have formed a part of a wider 
pattern of north-south relations (Brown W, 39: 2002). In this work the focus is on 
general relations between the EU and Africa and despite some sections on Zimbabwe, 
there is no deeper analysis of the motivational dimension of the relationship between 
Zimbabwe and the EU.  In another article Perez wrote that the conflict between 
Zimbabwe and EU clearly goes beyond what can be addressed through consultations 
under the Cotonou Agreement (Mercedes Garcia Perez: 115-6: 2007). In this article 
Perez made an effort to discuss the EU and Zimbabwe within the context of the current 
impasse based on the dispute over the legitimacy of the elections held from the year 
2000. Perez`s work is fruitful in partly understanding the EU politics on elections in 
Zimbabwe though it still does not go beyond to discuss the possible motives behind 
the respective EU policies in its relations with Zimbabwe.  
 
In a 1997 evaluation report Hilde Selbervik noted that   Norwegian aid policy vis-à-vis 
Zimbabwe is of course embedded in the overall South policy of Norway (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Evaluation report 7.97: 1997). In this report and related 
reports the presented picture deliberates on Norwegian aid policies towards developing 
countries. The reports provide salient information on comprehending the Norwegian 
aid policy. It has been the lack of a specific discussion on the real politick of the 
Norwegian Zimbabwe human rights cooperation in these existing works that has 
prompted this research to take a step further to bridge this gap.   
As will be noted throughout the paper a variety of secondary literature will employed 
in attempting to bridge the knowledge gap on understanding the motives and 
implications of the EU and Norwegian democracy and human rights policies towards 
Zimbabwe. The paper will analyze existing the literature`s positions on EU, 
Norwegian and Zimbabwe relations and attempt to merge interview and primary data 
in answering the research question under discussion.  The brief literature overview 
given in this section is typical of many other literatures on the subject in terms of their 
usefulness and limitations. This paper is therefore motivated by the desire to integrate 
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the available information on the subject with the data that has been researched to shade 
new light on the directions of the corporation between Zimbabwe, the European Union 
and Norway.  
Theoretical Framework 
 
Central theories and concepts within the field of realism and liberalism will inform the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. The international relations theories of realism and 
liberalism have emerged as offering relevance in analyzing the motives and 
implications of the European Union and Norwegian human rights policies towards 
Zimbabwe.   
 
 Realism and liberalism can be thought of as traditional approaches to security and just 
because they are labeled traditional does not mean they have been replaced by more 
recent thinking (A. Collins 2007:p5).  Some students of international politics believe 
that realism is obsolete- True if the conditions that a theory contemplated have 
changed , then it no longer applies- But what sort of changes would alter the 
international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer 
be relevant? (Waltz, 2000:5). Given this implied go ahead from Collins and Waltz, this 
thesis will employ realism and liberalism as its theoretical basis for analysis in this 
paper. 
  
Realism Theories 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau are some of the classical scholars who 
laid down the modern foundation of the theory of realism.  According to Doyle these 
philosophers hold that the best description of world politics is a jungle characterized  
by the constant possibility of  wars and this possibility requires that states follow `real 
politick`, i.e., be self interested, prepare for war and calculate relative balance of 
power (Doyle,2007:18). Historically this thinking heralded the quest for massive 
international colonization of nations by other nations substantiated by the Darwinism 
philosophy. Further Doyle points out a thought provoking argument which reads: 
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realist moral philosophy holds that individuals should accept the  `national interest` as 
an ideal, a one true guide to the formulation of the public policy of states in the 
dangerous international system (ibid. :19). Can it be argue that the Norwegian and EU 
foreign policy in general has been guided by this policy especially also in relation to 
Zimbabwe? Can the Norwegian and European publics have been generally made to 
submit to this national interest thinking by the European statesmen and can these 
populaces have been made to believe that the political set up in Zimbabwe, if allowed 
to go unpunished could set up an unparalleled threat to international European interests 
throughout its former colonies across the globe and especially in Africa? This might 
potentially be the EU view on the realist based side. The Norwegian and EU 
commission statements that will be analyzed in the chapters on Norwegian and EU`s 
policies and positions on Zimbabwe will help to explore these questions and 
arguments.  
 
Further arguments in the works of John Mearsheimer are of salience to the arguments 
to be advanced in this paper. He says “great powers, I argue, are always searching for 
opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. The 
system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core”. 
(Mearsheimer: 2001:29). He further says that “states operating in a self help world 
almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their 
interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international 
community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self help world”. (ibid.33.). 
The EU is composed of member states that have decided to come together in the hope 
that the togetherness might bring them a part realization of their search for global 
hegemony and fulfillment of  their self interests. In realist terms the argument by 
Mearsheimer might hold a large degree of validity in its relation to Zimbabwe. If left 
unchecked, the direction of Zimbabwe’s domestic policies might pose an immediate 
and long term threat to the EU security interests. Even the EU member states have 
tried at several stages to bring the Zimbabwe issue to the UN Security Council 
pointing out that this little nation poses a threat to international security. If that was 
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true, then to borrow from Mearsheimer, the security dilemma reflects the basic logic of 
offensive realism. (ibid. :35). 
 
Liberalism and Normative theories 
 
Liberal ideals are traced to the historical works of Locke, Kant and others. Doyle 
points out that the liberal theorists see the world political dynamics differently from 
the realist assumptions. As Doyle notes, liberal’s view of the world is that of a 
cultivatable `garden`, which combines a state of war with the state of peace. (Doyle, 
2007:19). According to the liberals, as noted by Doyle, a state`s interests are 
determined, not by its place in the international system, but which of the interests, 
ideals and activities of its members captures governmental authority. (Doyle, 
2007:19). Indeed this liberal argument is equally essential in analyzing the EU policy 
objectives towards Zimbabwe. Attempts to see the EU policy as merely based on 
realist paradigms might be flawed as the practical EU position might be a blended 
mixture of the demands of the freedom ideals of its populaces as well as the realist 
demands of its realist political statesmen. The interests of human rights oriented 
groups and publics in Europe might have led the EU to adopt a rational/genuine 
demand of a European style human rights regime in Zimbabwe. If this is the case then 
the theories of realism and liberalism can be used to search for an analytical 
understanding of the EU/Norwegian foreign and human rights policy approaches 
towards Zimbabwe.  On a similar issue regarding the normative side of the EU foreign 
policy, Helene Sjursen, in her article on “The EU as a normative power: how can this 
be?”, posed an interesting question of how can we know that the EU`s pursuit of 
norms is legitimate?. (Helene: 2006:1). Helene further noted that the conception of the 
EU as a normative, civilizing, ethical and civilian power is contested (ibid.:1). In 
pursuit of understanding the EU policy motives towards Zimbabwe such questions 
might be interesting to pursue as they might unravel deeper meanings behind their 
relations between the EU and Zimbabwe.  
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A contrast made by Robert Kagan as quoted by Helene is interesting for the purposes 
of the argument in this paper. Arguing that the Europeans come from Venus and the 
Americans from Mars, Kagan establishes a contrast between the realist US, which 
relies on military power and subscribes to  a perspective on international relations 
consistent with a so-called Hobbessian war of all against all, and the EU`s `Kantian` 
approach, focusing on `soft` civilian means. This proposition begs the question of 
where then can Zimbabwe in particular come from. We can say probably it comes 
from Mercury, a planet so small and so close to the sola system that observing and 
understanding it becomes difficult.  Yet Zimbabwe is not difficult to understand and 
yet it’s so small but yet so critical in those entities like the EU which might be 
interested in African foreign policy and power balancing.   
 
Further on the EU national interests and Liberal Idealist theories 
 
Jaane Matlary in her book on EU Security dilemmas pursued a notable argument 
which is of relevance in discussing the EU policy on Zimbabwe. Her argument is a 
general foreign policy position carried out by the EU but it has an insight into the 
emphasis that the general publics and politicians in Europe pursues different agendas 
in their human rights policies towards other nations. Matlary argues that the relevance 
of the domestic policy level (within the EU) has become very important, if not the 
most important factor in decision making (Matlary, 2008:3). Further Matlary says that 
security was always a province for the elite, the few who had special insights and 
special mandates – Now everyone takes an interest: NGOs, the media, the clergy, 
women’s groups and so forth (Matlary:2008:3-4). This approach is useful in 
understanding the liberal theory perspective on the EU`s position on Zimbabwe. The 
EU can not be understood without delving into what makes the EU an entity. Its 
people and its political institutions are what make the EU an EU. Thus in the liberal 
perspective, interest groups in form of NGOs like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch  have become some of the most vocal constituencies pressing for 
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genuine concerns for EU to press for a democracy and human rights agenda in 
Zimbabwe.   
  
Matlary has noted that the dominant theory of security studies- which is realism- rules 
out the importance of domestic factors in foreign policy and dismissed them, 
(Matlary:2008:4). This position is implicitly propagated by Patrick Morgan when he 
says that regardless of the explanation, realists have long depicted security as 
endangered by aggressive, revisionist, or revolutionary states. Hence the essence of 
international politics is competition for power, with power consisting ultimately of 
coercive capabilities. (Patrick Morgan in Collins, 2007:19). It will thus be interesting 
to discuss the dynamics of relations between the realist paradigm and domestic 
pressures on policy making in the EU approach towards Zimbabwe.   
    
Democracies of the right kind (i.e., liberal ones in EU) are peaceful in relation to one 
another- this is Immanuel Kant`s point (Waltz, 2000:7). In light of this position can 
one say that the EU position on Zimbabwe is partly derived on the EU`s perception of 
Zimbabwe as not being a right kind of democracy? Under the democratic peace model 
or theory, which is a branch of the liberal theories, might it therefore be a justifiable 
argument to say that the EU considers Zimbabwe’s rulers as undemocratic and thus 
justify the unwillingness to corporate with its regime which does not qualify to be part 
of the right league of democracies? The issue of perceptions on what a democracy is 
was fine tuned by John Owen when he argues that democracies that perceive one 
another to be liberal democracies will not fight (Owen in Waltz, 2000:7). Wayward 
democracies are especially tempting objects of intervention by other democracies that 
wish to save them (Waltz, 2000:9). Zimbabwe’s rulers argue that they are a democracy 
which has been holding elections constitutionally since the attainment of independence 
in 1980. Can the EU politicians have been of the view that Zimbabwe ceased to be a 
functional democracy? Has the EUs policy therefore become a punitive approach 
towards a wayward democracy which has gone wrong and a democracy that needs 
rehabilitation? If the EU genuinely see Zimbabwe as undemocratic and is trying to 
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make it a real democracy, why then should the EU human rights policy to Zimbabwe 
not be considered to be rational and genuine?  
 
The sections that follow will analyze these questions and arguments further based on 
official EU and Norwegian pronunciations thorough public statements, official 
documents, secondary sources and some interviews gathered during the course of 
researching for this paper. 
 
Organization of the Study 
An analytical and historical presentation of the human and land rights issues in 
Zimbabwe will be undertaken in chapter 2. This chapter will also give an overview of 
the historical relations between the EU and Zimbabwe as well as between Norway and 
Zimbabwe. The discussion in this chapter will be helpful in informing the arguments 
to be advanced in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 will be an analytical discussion of the 
research findings concerning the motives and implications of the European Union 
human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. It will discuss the tools employed by the EU 
in dealing with human rights issues in Zimbabwe. The fourth chapter will analyze the 
Norwegian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe and the motives and implications 
of such a policy. The tools that Norway has deployed to deal with Zimbabwe will also 
form the discussion in this chapter.  In this chapter there will be a comparison of the 
Norwegian approach vis-à-vis the EU approach in tackling the human rights 
challenges in Zimbabwe. The last section will be a conclusion of the whole research 
which will give recommendations or a possible way forward for relations between the 
EU, Norway and Zimbabwe. This section will wrap up with a summary of most of the 
arguments raised in this research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Zimbabwe as a case study- Human Rights, Land and Foreign Relations. 
A story of a fairy tale might arguably be one of the proper ways of writing the story of 
Zimbabwe and its international relations. Its domestic policy might too fit the fairy tale 
category. But the domestic policy of this nation has been largely shaped by its 
international relations regime, in as much as the international friends and foes of 
Zimbabwe have been made to react to the domestic policies of the country. Why is 
Zimbabwe a typical fairy tale in the third world context? Well her history, 
geographical location, natural resources as well as human resources have been of 
strategic significance in both the sub-continent and to the entire spheres of great power 
politics. In a recent article in the influential Guardian newspaper in the United 
Kingdom, one of Africa’s most prominent figures, the wife of nelson Mandela Graca 
Machel, pointed out that “that's one of the issues, particularly with the British people: 
because of the emotional attachment they have with Zimbabwe, in many cases they 
define the continent in terms of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is one country among 53 
countries, so you have all the rest of 52 countries”. (The Guardian 
Newspaper:18.04.10 ). On a similar tone, a notable writer, William Brown, highlighted 
that Zimbabwe is a special case: Zimbabwe`s independence differed from the general 
pattern. It became independent 15-20 yrs later than the vast majority of sub-Saharan 
African states (William Brown, 2002:140). If these statements arise from senior and 
seasoned figures on African politics then ignoring the significance of Zimbabwe in 
Africa might be food for thought for African policy makers. And already in 1977 a 
leading western expert on Zimbabwe, Robin Palmer noted that Rhodesia, as it was 
then called forms part of the central economic system of southern Africa (Palmer , 
1977: 246) . More so the pre and post colonial leadership of the nation from the British 
South Africa Company (BSAC), Ian Smith and Robert Mugabe have been complex 
stories of strategic thinking, misery, measured dictatorships and half hearted 
visionaries depending with who their audiences were. These complexities have had 
capacities to invite strong direct and indirect interventions of what are usually termed 
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great powers in international relations politics. It is not the essence of this paper to 
challenge the definitional problem concept of “great powers” despite its 
controversialities.  Based on the probable invitational consequences that the domestic 
policies of Zimbabwe have had to regional and international powers, it is then possible 
to contextualize the probable policy motives of those great powers and possible 
implications of their chosen policies. The EU as an undisputable great power in 
international politics is the case power to use as an example in discussing the dilemma 
of Zimbabwe. Milder humanitarian powers like Norway are suitable case powers in 
discussing this story as they might offer alternative approaches to those of greater 
powers. Zimbabwe`s policies have been many and its history has been long. As such I 
will focus on giving brief backgrounds on a few key issues which will make it possible 
to discuss the motives and probable implications of the EU and Norwegian human 
rights policies towards Zimbabwe.  These key issues are the backgrounds on 
Zimbabwe’s recent human rights history, her story of the struggle for land, the story of 
sanctions as well as a summarized history of her relations with the EU and Norway. 
Giving an explanatory picture on these issues is critical in seeing the position of 
Zimbabwe in relation to international actors as these issues have painfully shaped her 
nation building history.  
Zimbabwe’s recent history- on Human Rights and Democracy 
To say Zimbabwe`s history on human rights and democracy has been untroubled will 
be an unfortunate fantasy. And to say it has been historically unprogressive will sound 
unrealistic. Thus for instance as of 1997 in an evaluation report the Norwegian 
ministry of foreign affairs wrote that “Unlike many other African countries explicit 
political conditionality has not been applied to Zimbabwe by the donor community. 
This can be explained simply by reference to a relatively good human rights record, at 
least in comparison with many other countries in the region. Gross and persistent 
human rights violations have been rare in Zimbabwe though there has been 
deterioration (Hilde Selbervik, 1997: 54-55). Such has been the ups and downs in the 
country’s struggle for democracy and human rights. Giving a human rights picture of 
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events in Zimbabwe limited to the period beginning in the year 2000 is malicious to 
attempts to genuinely understand the context of the democracy problem the country is 
facing. It has been unfortunate that the new and young populaces of both the western 
and Zimbabwean communities have been made to learn the democratic deficit in 
Zimbabwe this way. If this problem does not go away in the near future, then the 
future generations will be faced with a problem that they will find hard to solve due to 
probable limited contextualization that they might have. Invading and colonizing 
Zimbabwe in 1890, based on the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 ushered in a period of 
heightened colonial activity on the part of the European powers, while simultaneously 
eliminating most existing forms of African autonomy and self-governance. From this 
day the story of Zimbabwe had to go through the greatest life changes of almost all 
times. The story of colonization is the root to the democratic and human rights deficit 
in Zimbabwe today.  For instance in a book on “democracy and human rights in 
Zimbabwe”, BJ Phiri and others analyses this issue at length. In the book Terence 
Ranger and Sabelo J. Ndlovu Gatsheni noted that missionaries and colonial officials 
worked to propagate the idea that much of the pre-colonial societies were 
undemocratic, whilst Welshman Ncube pointed out that in colonial Zimbabwe citizens 
could not always rely on colonial courts because evidence shows that that were times 
that the legal fraternity participated in the violation of human rights (BJ Phiri et al. 
2003: 544). It was the colonial administration of the BSAC and Ian Smith which 
described the black African populaces as savage and uncivilized with Ian Smith 
declaring that these savages will not rule Zimbabwe in a thousand years, a phrase 
which Ian Smith has mostly been known for. Fortunately or unfortunately for Smith, 
the thousand years were swept aside by the power of the need for savage democracy 
and savage majority rule, which was democracy.  And the thousand years become two 
decades. This was the typical story of human rights and democracy in colonial 
Zimbabwe where democracy meant apartheid and rule of the few by the few. 
 A remarkable date in the human rights history of Zimbabwe is the 18
th
 of April in 
1980. This is a date which closely defines democracy in the same way that the western 
nations do. It was a day in which free and fair elections, approved by what is called the 
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international community, were held and won by the majority. There was jubilation in 
African capitals as well as western capitals, including the capital of the former colonial 
power, the United Kingdom. This international jubilation was to continue in almost 
two decades to follow with the new leader of this nation, called Robert Mugabe being 
hailed as pragmatic and a visionary African hero. Little did this jubilation see the 
monumental problems ahead. To say Zimbabwe’s 1980 leadership, whether black or 
white, was not heroic would be an understatement of reality. It was indeed heroic and 
it will remain so in the context of those times and especially on that particular date on 
the 18
th
 of April. However the jubilation with this leadership planted the seeds of the 
human rights agony in today’s Zimbabwe.   
Having based their need to maintain order on the ills of the past, the post colonial 
leadership of Zimbabwe retained the instruments of the colonial administration to rule 
their newly born nation. Ian Smiths emergency orders remained in place, executive 
powers were strengthened and militarization of the state remained the order of the day. 
But the land issue was not addressed.  Being on the brink of a civil war in the 1980s, 
the victorious leadership unleashed the newly added state space, machinery and 
military power to solve what was perceived as a danger to state sovereignty. In the 
process a significant number of national innocent civilians lost their lives. And these 
lives are part of the life rights, which are human rights. History did not record a 
significant international condemnation of these events.  The post 2000 era was to 
repeat this mistake again. Moving from the 1980s decades into the 1990s era, the 
country`s leadership practiced and signaled intentions to maintain a one party state and 
again there was no meaningful recorded complaints from the international community. 
It remained business as usual and gone was the 1990s decade. Came the year 2000 and 
the fire alarm rang internally and externally to the human rights situation in 
Zimbabwe.  Why was it then and not before? The same 1980 administration is still the 
same 2000 administration in Zimbabwe. Why did I say colonialism is part of the root 
cause of the democratic deficit in this country? The fast changing human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe was exploited by the ruling administration as an attempt to 
correct colonial imbalances which they said were a threat to land and human rights of 
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the major majorities of the national populace. Thus the colonial card remained on the 
table and it still remains today, perhaps for political mileage. The African sub-
continent and majorities of other governments from what is called the third world 
become confused and apparently warmed up to the possibility of the rhetoric of 
colonial imbalances.  Maybe there is something to do with the perception of what 
democracy is to these third world nations. A leading Zimbabwean political scientist 
thus cautioned that in discussing democracy in Zimbabwe, it is important to note that 
there is no consensus yet as to the meaning of the term (Masipula Sithole 1988:217).   
In the western capitals the opposite was true. For the westerners there were no colonial 
related issues to do with the contemporary human rights realities in Zimbabwe. As 
such policies were adjusted in the western capitals to fit what they termed the changing 
human rights situation in Zimbabwe. It is these adjusted human rights policies towards 
Zimbabwe that we need to talk of in terms of motives and probable implications 
towards democracy in this country. Whilst the Zimbabwe administration was using the 
land reform card, the western capitals were using the sanctions card as part of the 
democratic restoration approaches. So it merits giving a background to these two 
issues as they seem central to the relational exchanges between the two sides.  
 
A Human Rights history of the Land issue in Zimbabwe. 
If there is one thing that defines Zimbabwe more than even its people, then the thing is 
the struggle for land. Even before colonialism local chieftaincies had skirmishes for 
land. When the Ndebele tribe came from South Africa’s KwaZulu Natal and resettled 
in Zimbabwe, they had skirmishes for land control which died down gradually as they 
decided to go along. After all, crossing borders was a normal thing for African 
chieftaincies during those years and after all they thought they were all Bantu people, 
meaning one family scattered across the region. Then came the inter-continental 
colonial era which saw the British occupation of Zimbabwe in 1890. Occupation in 
this case means occupying the land which defines the Zimbabweans. In the Shona 
traditions, it is believed that the spirits of their ancestors, called the spirit mediums 
(like spirit mediums Mkwati, Nehanda and Kaguvi) live in the land. When rains fail 
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they go into the land and into the mountains to ask these spirit mediums for rains and 
for guidance on issues of life and survival. The independence wars in Zimbabwe are 
believed to have been spiritually led by the Shona and Ndebele spirit mediums and it is 
believed these mediums that live and own all the land on behalf of the people were 
successful in bringing about independence.  Such is how land is valued in the history 
and contemporary life of the Zimbabweans.  Then to lose the land during the colonial 
period had far reaching ramifications to the human rights dimensions unfolding in this 
country today as well to the international relations of the nation. It is common 
knowledge that colonial and post colonial governments in Zimbabwe have exploited 
the land issue as pretext to perpetuate gross human rights abuses against their citizens. 
This has been true of the 1965 to 1979 government and all the governments 
afterwards. It merits therefore to give a brief picture of how human related land rights 
were and are like in pre- and post independence Zimbabwe. This helps in 
understanding how politicians exploit this issue as if it’s not a possible though 
unfortunate occurrence in human history.  
In his 1990 publication on land reform in Zimbabwe, an expert on Zimbabwe, Robin 
Palmer gave an insight into the centrality of land issues in the politics of the country. 
Palmer noted that “on 18 April 1990 the famous Lancaster House Constitution expires 
and the Zimbabwean government will then at last be able to tackle the contentious and 
highly politicized land question unhindered by the constraints imposed by Britain in 
1979/80. But there is every sign that the British government is striving behind the 
scenes to perpetuate Lancaster House beyond April 1990 and so prevent significant 
land reform from taking place in Zimbabwe (Palmer, 1990:163-64). If this was true 
then events in the recent past have proved how land can always shape the bad and the 
good in Zimbabwe. Already in his 1977 publication before independence Palmer had 
predicted the centrality of land politics in Zimbabwe noting that “the most acute and 
difficult question confronting the first government of Zimbabwe, whatever its 
ideological hue, will be that of land, bedeviled by its past use as a political and 
economic weapon by the whites, and by the consequent mythologies to which this has 
given rise (Palmer, 1977: 246). Palmer might have been right in pointing the 
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mythological issues associated with land in Zimbabwe. It might be the case in today’s 
Zimbabwe that even in cases where human rights abuses which have nothing to do 
with land take place, the current rulers attempt to turn into the politics of land as a 
rescue mechanism. Palmer might have been right too in noting how the colonial 
administration used land as a political and economic weapon towards the indigenous 
African population. A lengthy quote from a publication by a local and academically 
respected Zimbabwean educationist, Sam Moyo helps give a picture of how land 
issues are viewed in that country. Moyo says “the dominant fear that state led land 
reform will bring economic collapse is unfounded, given the social and political 
implications of a failure to address the land question.  Over six million indigenous 
black people live in Zimbabwe`s marginal rural lands, the communal areas. These 
areas have poor soils and unreliable rainfall, producers lack control of water rights and 
are duely excluded from the bulk of the nation`s natural resources. The unequal 
distribution of resources means than 4500 mainly white large scale farmers dominate 
Zimbabwe’s agrarian economy. Together with transnational capital, white agrarian 
interests control key sectors such as tourism, forestry, commodity, exports and narrow 
agro-industrial sector underlying the urban political economy. These imbalances 
dramatically skew income distribution in Zimbabwe, reflecting an unchanged legacy 
of colonial rule. Inspite of the liberation war, a narrow racial and class monopoly over 
land has been consolidated thorough extra market processes for decades”. (Sam Moyo: 
2000:5-6). The propositions I am highlighting here are propositions written by both 
African and European historians and academicians on land politics in Zimbabwe. 
These facts have meaning in understanding how land can easily be used by 
dictatorships and non dictators alike in the management of human rights regimes.  
On a similar note as Sam Moyo quoted elsewhere, Arthur Hazlewood noted what 
needs to be recalled in discussing the land issue in Zimbabwe. Hazelwood notes that “ 
It needs to be recalled that by virtue of the Land Tenure act of 1969 almost half of the 
country`s (Zimbabwe’s )  agricultural land was allocated to Europeans, who had 
`greater access to the regions considered suited to intensive crop and livestock 
production`, and on average, each of the nearly 7000 European farms were roughly 
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100 times the size of any of the 700 000 or so holdings in the Tribal Trust Lands ( land 
allocated to black Africans) ( Arthur Hazlewood: 1985: 457) . Similarly, in a 1993 
publication Gino Naldi noted that “with some seven million blacks living on 16 
million hectares of poor communal lands, the 12 million hectares owned by some 4500 
white large scale farmers constitute one third of the country’s arable land”.  (Gino 
Naldi: 1993:585). This a short and summarized picture of how land shaped the human 
right regime in colonial Zimbabwe. Rights were based on apartheid systems and it 
might therefore be unsurprising that the international community reacted by launching 
an attack on the colonial system in colonial Zimbabwe. Most members of the EU and 
Norway, who are part of  the subject of study in this paper were active in condemning 
this skewed set up in colonial Zimbabwe. They enacted sanctions against the minority 
rulers of those years and helped bring about a negotiated settlement which ushered in 
the special 18
th
 April independence day in Zimbabwe. What had to unfold more than 
two decades from this day was again a story of land and again with consequences to 
the human rights and international relations of the country.  
Having lost a constitutional referendum in the year 2000, the then Zimbabwean 
government unleashed a wave of its supporters to occupy vast lands occupied by large 
scale white commercial farmers. This was dubbed “the Third Chimurenga” (the third 
struggle”) and was portrayed as an attempt to regain land lost during the colonization 
process.  It has been reported that scores of white commercial farmers were killed and 
some lost properties built on those farms they were occupying for decades.  The exact 
number of how many white farmers were killed might be known in years to come. In 
the events of the same era, many black people lost their lives too. But some lost their 
lives far away from where the lands were being repossessed. For these people it is not 
clear if they had anything to do with the land reform agenda. Maybe again they were 
victims of land being used a tool for political enhancements. That’s why the issue of 
land in Zimbabwe has and will always shape the human rights agenda.  Any attempts 
to call for the correction of wayward human rights policies by the rulers of Zimbabwe 
might be interpreted by these rulers as neocolonial threats to local land ownership. As 
events have showed in the past, this strategy has proved a perfect sale to the 
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constituencies of the third world. Why then not face this issue, just face it, deal with it 
and what will be left in future as an excuse to subvert human rights of generations. The 
western capitals, and influentially the EU, in which the UK is a member has tried what 
it called targeted sanctions as part of the strategies to respond to what it called human 
rights abuses in today’s Zimbabwe. Norway too has responded to what it viewed as 
human rights abuses in this country. It might therefore help to give a brief picture of 
the historical relations between the European Union and Zimbabwe as well as between 
Norway and Zimbabwe.  Thereafter the paper will proceed to analyze the possible 
motives of the current human rights policies of these two blocks towards Zimbabwe as 
well their probable implications.  
EU Zimbabwe relations - a history  
Relations between the EU and Zimbabwe are not new. But these relations are volatile 
and dynamic. The relations are and were characterized by periods of struggles for 
ideals and sometimes for international survival. Cooperation between the European 
Union and Zimbabwe has been of significant influence to Zimbabwe`s internal 
economic, social and political dynamics. The links between these two blocks extends a 
long way back to the time when the country gained independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1980. The rights and obligations flowing from the Lome Convention and 
its successors have dominated Zimbabwe`s partnership with the EU (EU Commission 
19997:2). The EU human rights position on Zimbabwe has been more emphatical 
throughout their relations though the extents of the emphasis may have graduated to 
different levels in various periods. The Lome convention has formed a wider 
framework of relations between the EU and the nations of the African, Caribbean and 
the Pacific islands (ACP). The accession of Zimbabwe to Lome was greatly influenced 
by the EU`s desire for the newly independent country to solidify its relations with 
western states, and the accession formed a part of the process of defining the country`s 
entry into the international system. (William Brown: 2002: 139). Much of the 
acrimonial relations between the two nations have been played in and outside of the 
confines of the Lome Agreement. Possibilities for shifting the course of their relations 
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have also been viewed within this Agreement and now within the successor 
agreement, which is the Cotonou Agreement.  
Just like Norway, the EU has been offering aid to Zimbabwe for a long time. In fact 
the EU is the biggest donor to the country whilst Norway was the 8
th
 largest donor 
nation to Zimbabwe before 2000. The linkage between human rights and aid has been 
a very strong policy of the EU in relation to Zimbabwe. The implications of this policy 
to the democratization agenda in the country have been significant though the 
negativity or positivity degrees of these policies have been a question of wider debates.  
The relations between the EU and Zimbabwe have widely and directly affected the 
EU-Africa relations too.  Perez noted that the difficult relationship with Zimbabwe has 
had wider implications for the EU`s relations with the African Union (AU) and sub 
regional organizations (M.G.Perez 2007: 114).  Holding summits between the EU and 
Africa have been problematised by the tensions between the EU and Zimbabwe. The 
analysis of the Zimbabwe-EU human rights relations also need to done with the 
framework of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African countries. After 
the political crisis that started in Zimbabwe from the year 2000, the relations between 
the EU and Zimbabwe have deteriorated significantly. The pursuant deterioration in 
the relations allegedly on the grounds of human rights violations in Zimbabwe have 
seen a sharper and hostile EU approach to the country and the Zimbabwean 
government has also responded in a hostile way to the calls for improving the human 
rights violations in the country. The implications of the EU human rights approach to 
the democratization process in Zimbabwe is thus a critical undertaking to make, both 
for the sake of future EU policy making and for addressing the human rights 
challenges in Zimbabwe.  
 
Norwegian Zimbabwe Relations - a history  
 
Norwegian-Zimbabwe relations date back to the pre-independence era when Norway 
was part of an active international community of nations that campaigned against the 
colonial administration in Zimbabwe. Norway continued its state to state relations 
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from Zimbabwe’s attainment of independence in 1980 especially in form of 
development aid. (Selbervik:1997:57). Historical relations between the two nations 
since 1980 have been shaped by the aid policy of Norway and the human rights subject 
was minimal in the first two decades of their relations.  Human rights questions or the 
political situation in general has not been prominent in Norwegian-Zimbabwe aid 
relations before 2000. No explicit political conditionality has ever been imposed by the 
Norwegian government, at least before 1997. However in next meetings between 
Norway and Zimbabwe, Norway was expected to put more emphasis on human rights 
issues. (Selbervik, UD Evaluation Report: 1997:p57). Nevertheless since the year 2000 
the Norwegian government has increased its emphasis on human rights issues in its 
dealings with Zimbabwe. Thus promotion of human rights and democracy has become 
an increasingly important objective in the foreign policy of Norway (Selbervik: 1997: 
iv). As far back as 1997 the then Norwegian minister of development co-operation, 
Kari Nordheim-Larsen noted that” by means of development aid, we should endeavor 
to support measures, institutions and reform processes that promote democracy and 
human rights. (Development Today no.2, 1997). She acknowledged, however, that 
Norway often faces many dilemmas in the implementation of this policy (UD 
Evaluation Report: 1997: 52). It can be noted that the Norwegian foreign and aid 
policy to Zimbabwe had little emphasis on human rights issues at least up to around 
1999. The beginning of the 21
st
 century saw this policy shifting significantly owing to 
the worsening human rights conditions in Zimbabwe as opposed to the pre-1997 era 
when Hilde Selbervik pointed out that Zimbabwe had a relatively good human rights 
record, at least in comparison with many other countries in the region and that gross 
and persistent human rights violations have been rare in Zimbabwe though there has 
been a deterioration since 1997. (Selbervik: 1997: 54-55). As noted this situation has 
changed as has been the Norwegian human rights policy on Zimbabwe today. The 
implications of the contemporary Norwegian human rights approach to Zimbabwe`s 
democratization process is thus important in understanding and mapping future 
Norwegian-Zimbabwe relations especially in the promotion of democracy and human 
rights. The variances between the strong EU emphases on a tougher approach vis-à-vis 
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a moderated Norwegian human rights approach to dealings with Zimbabwe will be 
part of the deliberations to be made in the ensuing sections of this publication.  
 
Summary 
This chapter noted the inequalities that have been persistent with regards to land and 
human rights in Zimbabwe. Colonial administrators used the land as a weapon to 
control the majority of the population and thereby suppressing their human rights. The 
post colonial governments in Zimbabwe have also exploited the land issue as a tool to 
maintain power and to defend themselves. It has also been noted that relations between 
the EU and Zimbabwe have been troubled in the recent past. Similarly Norwegian- 
Zimbabwe relations have of late been unstable. The land and human rights issues have 
continued to interfere in the relations between the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe. Thus 
this background was vital in understanding the political dynamics of the foreign 
relations, human rights and economic issues in contemporary Zimbabwe.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The European Union and Zimbabwe: A Realistic Approach? 
 A number of policy instruments have been deployed by the EU block to manifest its 
human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. An endeavor to analyze the motives of the 
EU in implementing such human rights instruments on Zimbabwe is what this section 
intends to dwell on. There are many ways which the EU politically relates to 
Zimbabwe. This analysis will focus on some of the major EU policies on Zimbabwe. 
The selected policies for discussion are the sanctions policy, the civil society support 
policy, trade/economic relations and internal policy divergences within the EU on 
Zimbabwe and aspects on general foreign policy. To what extend do these policies 
explain the motives of the European Union towards Zimbabwe? Are the policies 
designed to entrench the European dominance and hegemony over Zimbabwe or are 
they tailored towards genuine promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe? The essence 
of this discussion is to dig a deeper hole in search of wanting to understand such 
questions. Discussions on the workability of sanctions as a policy have been going on 
for ages though an open discussion about the real motives behind such a tool have 
been slippery. Hereunder EU`s sanctions policy and possible motives on Zimbabwe 
will be deliberated upon.  
The Sanctions Instrument 
One of the most lethal weapons that humans have used to dominate or eliminate each 
other in human history has been the employment of sanctions in many forms. Some 
empires, kingdoms, monarchs, states and republics chose naval blockades, some chose 
food sanctions and some chose scorched earth policies to force their policy preferences 
over their enemy targets. In our discussion the EU chose what it defined as targeted 
sanctions against Zimbabwe. This method of targeted sanctions encompasses a 
mixture of military/arms embargo, travel restrictions and assets freeze.  The discussion 
of sanctions against Zimbabwe as an EU policy has in most cases raised boiling 
temperatures as there are wide varieties of arguments on who exactly the sanctions are 
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targeted at. Are they targeted at Zimbabwe or at Zimbabwe`s leadership?  This debate 
raises the question of the assumption versus reality of the sanctions. The following 
diagrammatic representation shows the EU definition of the sanction`s target and the 
other diagram shows the reality of the sanction`s target. This presentation assists in 
deliberating on the arguments of whether the sanctions tool is being employed as 
weapon to advance the EU`s interests on Zimbabwe or whether it is directed at 
promoting human rights in Zimbabwe.  
   
 
 
Diagram 3a above: This presentation (above) shows how the EU sees the sanctions from its own eye. 
It sees them as being targeted at specific individuals who undermine human rights in Zimbabwe. 
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Diagram 3b above : This diagram shows the reality of the effects of the EU sanctions on the life of 
Zimbabwe as a nation as well as against its leaders. 
Form the above mentioned diagramatic presentations it can be noted that there are two 
significantly different views on what kind of sanctions the European Union has placed 
on Zimbabwe. One view is that of the EU which claims that its sanctions are targeted 
sanctions- “measures that target specific people, resources, or services and that will 
reduce harmful humanitarian effects” ( Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 2007: 739). 
Targeted sanctions is a policy measure that came into being after policy makers 
realised the limits of comprehensive sanctions which did not spare innocent civialian 
populations. If the EU sanctions on Zimbabwe are really intended to force genuine 
political reform in Zimbabwe then there should be actions from the EU which proves 
it. The two major political parties in Zimbabwe, namely the MDC and the ZANU-PF, 
entered into a political agreement which they call the Global Political Agreement 
(GPA). In an interview with Doctor Sabelo Ndlovu who is a historian and lecturer on 
Zimbabwean and African politics, he pointed out that the EU imposed restrictive 
measures (sanctions) on Zimbabwe as a way of forcing ZANU-PF to negotiate with 
the MDC  for a political settlement to the crisis in the country. Dr Ndlovu went on to 
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note that since the MDC and ZANU-PF have signed a political agreement (GPA), then 
the EU should lift the restrictions/sanctions ( Interview with Dr Sabelo). This position 
sounds pragmatic. At first the European Union claimed that they wanted the parties to 
negotiate a settlement before the EU can lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe. After the 
parties reached a signed agreement and formed a new government, the EU is still 
refusing to lift the sanctions. What then is the motive behind such behaviour? 
A possible description of the EU`s position on sanctions against Zimbabwe can be that 
the EU block is pushing its own interests rather the interests of the people of 
Zimbabwe. This can be depicted by the second diagram (3b) in the drawing above 
which shows that the real sanctions against Zimbabwe go beyond targeted sanctions. 
The sanctions have led to economic stagnation in the country. The economic and 
political consequence of the sanctions have led to the demise of the health, education, 
social services and the employment sectors, just to mention a few. The reality is that 
the country has not managed to borrow from the IMF and the World Bank as well as 
major international financial institutions. The debilitating effects of the sanctions have 
had no meaningful impact on the ruling elites in Zimbabwe. Infact it has been the 
general populace which has been suffering in this country. It has been widely reported 
that unemployment in Zimbabwe between the period 2003 to 2010 neared between 70 
to 94 percent. This is one of the worst recorded unemployment figures in the history of 
nations. Despite the impact of these sanctions the EU has continued to use diplomatic 
language like “targeted sanctions” when the reality shows that these sanctions are both 
targeted and comprehensive against the generall people. Chantal de Jonge made a 
meaningful observation in realtion to sanctions. She noted that “underlying the theory 
of sanctions is the expectation that economic costs will translate into political effects – 
that economic deprivation will produce public anger and politically significant protest. 
It is expected that this, in turn, will lead to changes in the behaviour of troublemaking 
elites or to their removal from power” ( Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 2007: 743). By so 
doing the imposer of sanctions will achieve his/her self interests. From this view point 
the EU can be said to be pushing for its own interests rather than the interests of real 
development in Zimbabwe. The EU block has an interest of seeing a government 
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which they believe can make it possible for the EU to extract its interests in 
Zimbabwe. There are possible alternatives that the EU could employ in order to target 
political authoritarians in Zimbabwe. Instead of economic sanctions imposed under the 
name of “targeted sanctions”, the EU should make their case in the United Nations 
Security Council. If the UN Security Council imposes sanctions against Zimbabwe 
then their legitimacy will be difficult to argue against. Thus if EU member states want 
to genuinely help Zimbabwe to develop a strong and sound human rights and 
economic situation, then the United Nations should be respected as a body that has the 
mandate to impose such sanctions.  Furthermore the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) can be a useful instrument in targeting violators of human rights in Zimbabwe 
instead of sanctions. A reformed, balanced, credible and apolitical ICC can be given 
evidence of the human rights abuses and then issue arrest warrants against the human 
rights violators. The same basis that the ICC might use to prosecute human rights 
violators in Zimbabwe should be swiftly used to prosecute human rights violators in 
any country of the world without exception.  This might prove more genuine in efforts 
to avert the ongoing human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The EU`s self interest position 
on Zimbabwe does not translate to mean the absence of the need for reforms in the 
country`s human rights policy. 
Beyond any reasonable doubt there have been persistant state supported human rights 
violations in Zimbabwe since her recent recorded history from the 1890s to the current 
era. It is also strongly evident that the period from the year 2000 to the present has 
witnessed one of the most politically charged human rights violations in the post 
colonial history of the  nation. The fact that the country has experienced human rights 
abuses from colonial adminstrators can not be a justification for continued human 
rights abuses today. Most nations of the world have gone through rights abuses of 
unimanginable proportions but such histories have not stopped the civilisation of 
nations into peaceful and progressive nations. Examples from Europe can best explain 
such scenarios. Despite the agonies of the first and second world wars, Europe has put 
the histories behind them and have learnt from such histories that human rights respect 
is one of the most cheritable gifts to mankind. As such it would be admirable if the 
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EU`s human rights policy towards Zimbabwe was tailored towards imposing such 
progressive values of the respect for human rights and democracy. Unfrotunately the 
current policies of the EU have not offered suffiecient proof that it has the genuine 
intention to help the general people in Zimbabwe out of the woods. 
More so if the EU sees the government in Zimbabwe as undemocratic, then it comes 
back to the arguments of the differences between the defining the concept of 
democracy. Whereas the western developed nations see most governments from the 
developing world as undemocratic, it is hard to think that dictators see themselves as 
dictators.  William Brown noted that defining `democratic` government is a rather 
more contested idea, which is less widely accepted and is dismissed by some 
(normally authoritarian) southern regimes as a `western` notion of government 
unsuitable to Asian, African or less usually, Latin American societies (William Brown, 
2002: 121). This argument seems to be the same position advanced by the southern 
rulers in Zimbabwe. They exploit the incompetence of the EU`s sanctions position and 
preach the gospel that the western governments want to impose their cultures on the 
country. This has probably made the ruling class in Zimbabwe to hold on to power 
with sympathy from African nations who are tempted to believe this argument. If the 
EU had taken the route of convincing the UN security council to impose the sanctions 
on Zimbabwe, then the argument that the EU is fighting to impose its self-will on 
Zimbabwe would be significantly weakened, though it will not be removed unless the 
representation system in the UN security council is altered to reflect the post world 
war II and post cold war set up in today`s world.   Thus the EU has a lot of work to do 
in order to convince the people of Zimbabwe that its intentions are not self interested 
rhetoricism.  
Notes about a telephone interview on the EU and Zimbabwe with Dr Sabelo Ndlovu 
on 17 February 2010 whilst he was in South Africa. The discussion interview took 
about one hour.  
Dr Ndlovu was a lecturer of African History and Development Studies at the Midlands 
State University in Zimbabwe and a lecturer at the Ferguson School of African and 
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Oriental Studies at Oxford University in the United Kingdom and he wrote a number 
of articles in Journals of African Studies. He has written a number of books on the 
History of Zimbabwe alongside Zimbabwean experts like Terrence Ranger. At the 
time of the interview he was planning to join the South African Institute of 
International Affairs.    
Question: Dr Ndlovu I need your help in dissecting the EU`s position on Zimbabwe in 
terms of sanctions and their motives. What are the sanctions designed to do by the 
EU? 
DR Ndlovu: I would not like to call them sanctions. They are restrictive measures 
imposed by the European Union on Zimbabwe. It should be noted that the United 
Kingdom has its own measures against Zimbabwe which are different from the EU. 
Thus UK has two sanctions against Zimbabwe: as an EU member and their own 
bilateral restrictions on Zimbabwe. The main actors are the EU and the UK but 
Canada, USA and Australia also follow the main actors and sometimes act on their 
own. It is true that the main actors like the EU and UK have their own interests in 
Zimbabwe. UK and EU have different interests and that is why you see that the UK has 
its own measures.  The United Kingdom for instance has said even if the EU lifts the 
restrictions, it will not follow suit until it feels that things have changed in Zimbabwe. 
Why did the EU or UK put restrictive measures on Zimbabwe? It is partly because they 
needed to pressure ZANU PF into negotiations since things were going badly in the 
country. Now that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) or coalition agreement has 
been signed the measures must be removed. Again the tricky part is that there 
seems to be no movement in the GPA and that’s why the EU extended the measures 
from the beginning of 2010.   
This is a brief extract from an interview I had with Doctor Sabelo Ndlovu. He 
preferred to employ the term “restrictive” supposedly because he is a senior 
connection in the ruling MDC political party.  Dr Ndlovu`s comments gives insights 
into the study of trying to understand the EU human rights policy and motives towards 
Zimbabwe. If, as he pointed out that the sanctions were meant to pressure the then 
ruling party into negotiations, can we therefore say that the restrictive measures, which 
I will call sanctions, makes the EU rational? In fact, it might rather mean that the EU 
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has a double agenda in imposing the sanctions. As noted and as will be discussed 
throughout the paper the EU wants to promote its own self interests as well as having a 
genuine desire to foster an environment in which human rights are respected in 
Zimbabwe. By actively participating in the design for a political coalition the EU 
thought that this would bring an environment through which it can genuinely help the 
people in the country to realize democracy. At the same time the EU thought that the 
coalition agreement will present an opportunity for gradual political transition in the 
country which will enable the long term self interests of the EU to be realized in the 
form of economic benefits as will be discussed on the section on the economic 
dynamics of the EU`s human rights policy.  What can also be noted from this 
discussion with Ndlovu is that the reality on the ground shows very limited signs in the 
implementation of the coalition agreement to date. This has presented challenges to the 
EU in terms of whether they should lift the sanction or not. If the sanctions are 
genuinely meant to force the political parties to promote human rights in Zimbabwe, 
then their objectives are far from being realized and as such it might take dear time 
before the sanctions are revised or lifted. If the sanctions are in realism terms meant as 
foreign policy tool to dominate and extract resources, then the sanctions have achieved 
in domination and failed on extraction; at least for now.  On these premises it becomes 
difficult to see how these sanctions can be said to be successful in the foreseeable 
future.    
The Economics of Human Rights- Who rules the trade, aid and the economy? 
Why does the EU need Zimbabwe or does it need her at all? What shapes and governs 
trade and economic relations between the EU block and Zimbabwe? Responses to such 
questions assist in gaining hind sights into the probable motives of the EU human 
rights and foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. For most major European nations their 
connections with Africa are not new. Such connections are rooted in long histories of 
colonial governance and capitalism. Initial formalization of relations between the 
European community and the African nations as blocks were mired within the context 
of their colonial past and the European desire to help developing nations to develop 
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their economies. Treaties began as the norm to regularize and formalize these 
corporations. Here under the Treaty of Rome and later the Cotonou Agreement will be 
discussed as they are the benchmarks upon which the EU relates to Zimbabwe.   
As McMahon.J.A (1998:1) noted, specific objectives are set for the EC`s development 
cooperation policy in Article 130u of the Treaty of Rome introduced by the Treaty of 
the European Union. It stipulates that: 
European Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: 
 the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries 
and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;  
 the smooth and gradual integration of the developing  countries into the world 
economy 
 The campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
 European Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and 
to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. (McMahon 
Joseph A: 1998: 1).  
The vision of the European Community (and/or EU) as stipulated in the quoted 
extracts from the Treaty of Rome was designed to assist in uplifting the economies of 
the developing world and especially African ones. Europe was committing itself to 
helping in sustainable social and economic development, integration of developing 
economies into the global economy, fighting poverty and most crucially to promote 
the rule of law and human rights.  Further,  article 1 of the first Lome Convention 
states that in the field of trade co-operation, the object of this Convention is to promote 
trade between the Contracting Parties, taking account of their respective levels of  
development, and in particular, of the need to secure additional benefits for the trade of 
ACP States, in order to accelerate the rate of growth of their trade and improve the 
conditions of access of their products to the markets of the European Economic 
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Community, so as to ensure a better balance in the trade of the Contracting Parties  
(McMahon Joseph A: 1998:45).  It can be noted from both the Treaty of Rome and the 
Lome Convention that if the real motives of the EU have been to assist economies of 
poor nations, then the economies of the developing nations would have shot up 
significantly. Olufemi and Gerrit have stated that  the overall welfare of the ACP 
countries has been disappointing- perhaps the most telling statistics is the share of 
ACP products in total EU imports (imports from the South), which has precipitously 
declined from roughly eight percent (20%) in 1975 to under 4% (9%) by the late 
1990s.  (Babarinde Olufemi and Faber Gerrit: 2005:26). In general it can be noted that 
developing nations have not gained much from the economic corporation between 
them and the EU. The story of Zimbabwe turned from hope to grim. In the last decades 
owing to a conglomeration of causes ranging from economic mismanagement by the 
sitting government and lack of rule of law, to sanctions and international isolation of 
the nation, the country has been brought down to its knees. 
It is of paramount significance to note that the economics of a nation is crucial to its 
survival, coupled with correct management manifested through governance and human 
rights regimes. To such an end the economy of Zimbabwe has been found wanting. It 
is problematic to think that the general people of Zimbabwe own their economy. The 
sad reality is that the new rulers of the nation have adopted their predecessor`s culture 
of economic aggrandizement at the expense of national development. Despite repeated 
arguments by the post independence government in Zimbabwe that the EU is the 
architecture of the country`s economic woes, the facts on the ground shows that the 
government itself shares a significant responsibility for the economic decline in the 
country. External factors alone cannot explain the decay of nation`s economy. 
Economies which survive in liberal and democratic environments do not free fall as 
the case with what transpired in Zimbabwe.  The Zimbabwean economy is estimated 
to have shrunk by more than 40-50% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) within 10 
years from the year 2000. However the external economic power of the EU cannot be 
ignored in relation to the economic development of Zimbabwe. It can be argued that 
the EU has strong economic motives that rival the motive to promote human rights 
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values in Zimbabwe. The European block sees Zimbabwe as a potential economic 
haven as Africa becomes the last frontier in the fight for resources. Van Mirjam 
therefore rightly noted that the relations between the EU and the developing world are 
rooted in three major historical circumstances:  Europe’s colonial past, the politics of 
the Cold War, and the creation and expansion of the EU( Van Reisen Mirjam:2007:59) 
She further notes that the EU needs the South, it needs energy, raw materials, primary 
products, and minerals; the EU needs the labor forces of the South, the export markets 
they provide, and as locations for foreign direct investment..(Van Reisen Mirjam: 
2007:59). The tables below help to explain the economic control that the EU has on 
Zimbabwe which makes it a possibility that the economic protection of its interests in 
Zimbabwe cannot be ignored. The tables have been made with data from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. I extracted data related to European 
investments in Zimbabwe over time in an endeavor to solicit an understanding of the 
significance of the EU`s potential economic motives in Zimbabwe. 
Largest  Affiliates of Foreign based Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Zimbabwe- 
Table 3a 
       
       COMPANY 
 
HOST ECONOMY INDUSTRY 
  
     CSC Meat importers UK 
 
Food & kindred products 
 Africa Plantations ltd USA 
 
Agriculture 
  Bicc Cafca 
 
Netherlands 
 
Metals 
  Tobacco Processors Zim UK 
 
Tobacco 
  ZSR Ltd 
 
UK 
 
Trade/sugar 
  Constain Africa UK 
 
Construction 
  Ashanti Goldfields Zim UK 
 
Trade/Minerals 
 Zim United Transport UK 
 
Finance 
  Merchant Bank C Africa Switzerland 
 
Finance 
  Delta Gold Zimbabwe Australia 
 
Finance 
  
       Source: data extracted from United Nations Conference on Trade & Development,  
FDI Brief on Zimbabwe 1992-2002. 
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As can be noted from the table above (table 3a) most of the largest foreign owned 
companies in Zimbabwe are owned by industries from the EU, especially the UK. This 
also partly explains the dynamics within the EU whereby they sometimes compete for 
resources in their foreign policy undertakings and in the process human rights is made 
a victim.  The mentioned companies in this table like Zimbabwe Sugar Refineries 
(ZSR), Tobacco Processors Zimbabwe, Constain and the Cold Storage Company are 
some of the major entities that control real production of resources in Zimbabwe. It is 
unimaginable to think that the EU will ignore a situation whereby a government in 
Zimbabwe takes over lands that feeds these large companies. The realism theorists 
argue therefore that such international politicking is a fight for domination of other 
nations in order to promote self interests of the stronger states. 
 
Most foreign investments in Zimbabwe originate from the western nations especially 
the EU which is the largest trading partner as well as donor for Zimbabwe. Tables 
below are designed to give a brief picture of how much influence the EU has through 
Foreign Direct Investments in Zimbabwe as well as giving a picture of the economic 
situation in Zimbabwe which can be linked to the human rights disrespect in the 
country. The data in the tables is made with figures from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2003.  
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Zimbabwe Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Stocks- (in millions of US dollars) 
 
       FDI Flows-Zimbabwe- millions of US$. 
    Kolonne1 1985-1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Inward flows 14 444 59 23 4 26 
Outward flows 12 9 9 8 4 3 
       
       Table 3b 
      Source :Table made with  Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics 
       
       FDI Flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation of Zimbabwe.
Kolonne1 1985-1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 Inward flows 0,8 7,,2  2,6 0,5 7,5 
 Outward flows 0,9 1,1 0,8 0,6 0,9 
 
       Table 3c 
      Source :Table made with  Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics 
       FDI Stocks-Zimbabwe- millions of US$. 
    Kolonne1 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Inward stocks 186 124 342 1085 1088 1 114 
Outward stocks 
 
88 137 241 245 249 
       Table 3d 
      Source :Table made with  Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics 
 
 
       FDI Stocks as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Zimbabwe. 
Kolonne1 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 
 Inward stocks 2..8 1,4 15,5 11,8 5..8 
 Outwards stocks 
 
1 3,4 2,7 1,3 
 
       Table 3e 
      Source :Table made with  Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics 
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Data from these tables help to understand that Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into 
Zimbabwe have a potential be utilized as a measure of economic control on Zimbabwe 
which the EU has arguably attempted to do. As can be noted from tables 3c and 3e 
Inward flows and stocks of FDI into Zimbabwe have always been higher as percentage 
terms of fixed capital formation and GDP. Inward flows show how much money in US 
dollars has been invested in Zimbabwe. Inward stocks show how much value do 
foreign owned assets settled in Zimbabwe as investments are worth. Outward flows 
and Outward stocks show much Zimbabwe has invested outside her borders. Noting 
that inward flows are higher than outwards flows, it means therefore that the EU has 
much power to lock and unlock the economy of Zimbabwe as it has done through parts 
of the sanctions imposed on the country. On a note on what the European Commission 
is doing to support governance, democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, the 
commission noted that the 10
th
 European Development Fund agreed with Zimbabwe “ 
will be implemented as soon as the restrictive policy (sanctions) towards Zimbabwe is 
lifted” (Delegation of the European Union in Zimbabwe website).  This statement 
from the European delegation in Zimbabwe serves to show that the sanctions against 
Zimbabwe are imposed on Zimbabwe as a nation and not only against the ruling party 
individuals in the country. The term “restrictive” come into force after the EU realized 
that use of the term “sanctions” would impede the signing of the current coalition 
agreement in Zimbabwe and after the EU realized that the term “sanctions” can easily 
be manipulated to campaign against it by the long time presidency in the country 
which favors no democracy at the present moment.  
The data from the tables also further helps to explain the controlling motives of the EU 
to the economy of Zimbabwe. Noting that the undemocratic government in Zimbabwe 
was threatening their investments, the restrictive (sanctions) measures of the EU meant 
that large TNCs from Europe could not make much profit in Zimbabwe. At the same 
time the EU can simply instruct their companies to withdraw investment from 
Zimbabwe and thereby suffocating the economy and small industries which dependent 
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on the bigger companies. Other companies on the tables (table 3a about large TNCs in 
Zimbabwe) like Delta Gold Zimbabwe are Australian owned. Australia is a country 
which easily follows the lead of the EU in its policy on Zimbabwe and as can be 
remembered the Australian monarch is the Queen of England, which makes Australia 
to have closer connections with Europe in addition to the historical circumstances. It 
can thus be argued that in realist terms the European Union has both economic and 
political self interest in its human rights politicking on Zimbabwe. It is not the 
assertion of this research work that the policies are always negative. Rather the EU`s  
political economy of human rights on Zimbabwe reveals the economic motives of the 
block in its foreign policy engagements with Zimbabwe.  
Civil Society Corporation Technique: “EUs hand of God?” 
That the socio-political and economic world is changing, is an element that the global 
citizens having been finding hard to deny. A critical part of this change in equation has 
been the rising influence of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). A meaningful and practical reality is that the relations between 
the European Union and Zimbabwe have been agonizingly strained by the issue 
NGOs. More so it is a fact that both sides have attempted to use the NGO politick for 
their policy advancement. Is the EU utilizing the NGOs as the undercover for the 
advancement of its self interests or is the EU-NGO Corporation simply for the rational 
promotion of EU values on governance or for real human rights purposes? In other 
words is the EU employing NGOs as tools to achieve its motives? Debates on such 
issues have been nut cracking and inconclusive.  
Vehement propositions argue for different positions in response to the question of the 
efficacy of civil society organizations in development. In the case of Zimbabwe, her 
government has always argued pessimistically against NGOs. Zimbabwe`s current 
rulers (meaning the President`s supporters who have actual power in the coalition 
administration) have argued that the EU has been and is still using the NGOs as a tool 
for promoting their self economic and political agendas. Is this a fair assessment by the 
government of Zimbabwe regarding the EU`s policy towards Zimbabwe via NGOs? 
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As noted this issue is always an inconclusive debate. Nevertheless it cannot be denied 
that a plethora of evidence from the local and international organizations have proved 
that the current situation in Zimbabwe is fraught with deep human rights violations. It 
is hard to deny that the European origin NGOs have arguably been of tremendous 
significance in helping a sizeable majority of rural Zimbabweans to beat the serious 
threats to their survival brought about by the latest and reoccurring episodes of hunger, 
drought and multi faceted economic decline of the nation. These NGOs have largely 
been raising finances from the European publics and governments to finance their 
development operations in Zimbabwe. The tricky part in the life of some of the NGOs 
who operate in Zimbabwe has been that they receive some of their donations from 
their home governments. The unfortunate consequence of such a policy has been that 
when such organizations are from perceived hostile EU member governments, they 
have been labeled western tools of destabilization. EU based NGOs from nations like 
Great Britain have especially been the focus of suspicion by the government in 
Zimbabwe.  Differences in the role of what NGOs should play in Zimbabwean and 
African development in general have been sources of tensions between the EU and 
Zimbabwe and thereby driving the suspicion from Zimbabwe that the EU based NGOs 
are not a source for good.   
During the ministerial negotiations held in Brussels in July 1999, all parties 
acknowledged the importance of associating non-state actors in order to strengthen the 
partnership between the EU and the ACP Group (Carbone Maurizio: 2005:184) . 
However, the EU argued for consulting and informing non-state actors in political 
dialogue, dialogue on corporation strategies, and implementing the cooperation 
agreement; the ACP Group, while accepting that non-governmental actors should be 
associated, stressed once again the primary role of national authorities in development, 
and even questioned governance, accountability and transparency of CSOs (Carbone 
Maurizio: 2005:184). From such a standpoint it can be noted that the view of 
developing nations towards NGOs differs significantly from the European position. 
The case of Zimbabwe`s stance towards NGOs is a classical example that can be 
applied to lessons on most developing nations. It can be noted from the above 
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statement that the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations are said to even 
question the accountability and transparency of NGOs. The near reality is that indeed a 
member nation of the ACP like Zimbabwe accepts NGOs in its society not out of will 
but as a no option scenario. A Zimbabwean government of today can only whole 
heartedly accept NGOs if such entities agree to be blind to human rights abuses and 
ignore the language of democracy. It can be as such due the fact that the current 
administration in the country does not adore democracy. In my conversation with Kofi 
Annan, the former UN Secretary General, he was clear that the situation in Zimbabwe 
was terrible. I met Mr. Annan in February 2009 at an annual strategic meeting for the 
Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights in Norway where I was doing my internship. 
In my five minute discussion with him, Mr. Annan was clear in our conversation that 
he sees no real interest in the government of Zimbabwe to reform for the better of 
human rights. Mr. Annan however noted to me that it is the role of NGOs to attempt to 
influence the systems by speaking out against abuses in objective ways. I had a similar 
discussion with the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Laurite, Professor Wangari Maathai of 
Kenya during a World Environmental Day ceremony in June 2007 in Tromsø, 
Norway. Professor Maathai expressed to me the importance of civil society activism in 
development issues and in particular to human rights challenges in Zimbabwe. Based 
on such sharing from human rights campaigners and policy makers it can be argued 
that well intentioned NGOs can be a force for progressive change.  Nevertheless 
despite being a notable potential forces for development NGOs have been accused of 
pushing the EU`s agenda for political and self interests by dictators who sees them as 
obstacles. But can it be totally said that the NGOs are pure angels for development in 
Zimbabwe? Can it be said that the NGOs have not been manipulated to pursue 
interests of the EU?  
Not all NGOs from the EU operating in Zimbabwe have been found to be politically 
and economically independent from the EU foreign policy. The conduct of some of the 
NGOs has been shroud with inconsistencies and this has in the end landed them into 
criticisms that are problematic to defend. As noted earlier the history of land in 
Zimbabwe is what defines much of what this nation will suffer or prosper. The death 
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or survival of an agro-mining economy like Zimbabwe depends mostly on land 
ownership. As such the catastrophic shouts and sustained campaigns by many NGOs 
against the government of Zimbabwe during a time when this administration used the 
politics of land reform from the year 2000 onwards was self defeating for the purposes 
that the NGOs wanted to achieve. For the NGOs it was a campaign designed to end or 
stop perpetration of violence and potential mass murder. Their intentions can hardly be 
said to have been misguided. Indeed it sounds like the NGOs had good intentions. 
Most of them campaigned vigorously for the imposition of (targeted) sanctions against 
Zimbabwe. They campaigned for European governments and like minded nations to 
impose the sanctions. In the end the reality on the ground in Zimbabwe is that the 
isolation of Zimbabwe brought about, in part, by the collaboration between the EU and 
its NGOs to sanction the country has deprived her populace of life, dignity and 
friendships. More so the fact that the NGOs were silent during many eras of violence 
and deprivation in the larger part of the history of Zimbabwe weakens their current 
argument and consequently that of the EU as benefactors of this nation.  Current 
voices from the EU and the NGOs support compensation to those who supposedly lost 
lands from the year 2000 onwards and make it the main hidden pre-condition for 
unscrewing the sanctions pipe. Indeed in a world of property rights and investment 
incentives there should be impartial regimes of fair compensations for lost properties. 
However what weakens the argument of the EU and the EU based human rights 
organizations is that no one has reminded them that the history of Zimbabwe does not 
start in the year 2000. The totality of her history from 1890 is what needs to be 
understood and then a holistic approach to tackling the land and human rights issues in 
Zimbabwe can be found. If the EU partners its NGOs in ignoring the fact that the scars 
of Zimbabwe are a result of more than a century of apartheid policies which had no 
land rights for certain groups at all, then the long term solution to the human rights in 
Zimbabwe will remain elusive. The historical injustices have a high chance of being 
manipulated by current and future politicians to sustain political power and subdue 
democracy when it goes against their interests. Even a government which the EU and 
the EU based NGOs wishes to see in Zimbabwe today provides no absolute guarantees 
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that they will not use the meandered historicity of land and justice when the political 
need arises in future. In the end it will be highly likely that it is democracy and human 
rights that will lose. It should be remembered that democracy and human rights are not 
living creatures but are rather rights of the people to freedom from violence, want and 
deprivation. Thus if the EU and NGOs, powerful as they are, continue with deliberate 
ignorance to the need for historical, holistic and contemporary justice in Zimbabwe, 
then even their pursuit of rational or self interested motives for universal human rights 
realization will remain in and out of the intensive care unit in Zimbabwe. The EU`s 
strategic partnership with NGOs towards democratization in Zimbabwe is a noble idea 
that lacks the willingness to understand what should be understood in order to  help 
with a solution to the crisis. The hard truth is that Zimbabwe cannot do without the 
European Union and the NGOs. She needs them in as much as Europe needs 
Zimbabwe to promote her values on human rights, dignity and democracy.     
Zimbabwe –A platform to impose the rational values of the EU? 
The question of values is central to all cultures. In as much as different cultures argue 
in support of their traditional and cultural values, there is no justification in arguing for 
a culture that supports violence and terror. Zimbabwe is not such a culture and neither 
is the EU. However the recent developments in the political life of Zimbabwe is a 
disturbing scenario which calls for urgent and well intentioned democratic cultures to 
intervene in breaking the possibility of a potential culture of intolerance and violence. 
This is where the EU`s push for democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe is put to 
the test. Again this is a case where the European Union can prove its credentials by 
genuinely helping to rebuild Zimbabwe through supporting the culture of tolerance 
and universal respect of human rights and restorative justice. In her article entitled “ 
The enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What future”, Van Mirjam 
accurately noted that the EU also needs the South to promote the values on which it 
was founded- the European values of social democracy, the promotion of human 
rights, and accountable and transparent governance (Van Reisen Mirjam: 2007:59). 
Promoting democratic values in a transparent manner necessitates one to be a credible 
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international player. By so doing the EU can expand its horizon in influencing 
international cultures and Zimbabwe`s culture in particular to be reformative in the 
human rights arena. Van Reisen Mirjam went further noting that the EU needs the 
South if it wants to fulfill its aspirations of becoming a global player- If the EU rejects 
the notion of a unipolar world that is dictated to by the United States it will need to 
seek alliances with the South (Van Reisen Mirjam: 2007:59). As a very influential 
nation in African liberation theology and contemporary African politics, Zimbabwe is 
a nation that a serious EU African policy planner will ignore at their future peril. This 
is not overvaluing the significance of Zimbabwe but rather this position is in line with 
events which have shown the significance of Zimbabwe to the whole of Africa. A 
plethora of national and international NGOs have noted in several communiqués that 
the situation in Zimbabwe has the greatest potential to lead or destroy the way for 
African democracy. As such the EU has the challenge of making her intentions clear 
by promoting a culture of genuine democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe without 
compromising her possibilities by fronting realism based self interests designed for 
domination akin to the 19
th
 century politics.   
An interview discussion I had with Marianne Riddervold a Doctoral Candidate at the 
Norwegian Center for European Research (ARENA) might also help in gaining an 
understanding on general European Union Foreign Policy. The discussion with 
Marianne was held on 22 December 2009 at the ARENA offices at Ullevål in Oslo for 
about 3 hours from 1500hrs to 1800hrs Norwegian time. Before the interview we had 
communicated by email and I managed to set up this appointment. This is what she 
had to say and I paraphrase the discussion: the traditional understanding is that the EU 
foreign policy is based on realistic assumptions of material interests. To some extend it 
might be true but I think norms and rationality forms a significant part of influences to 
EU`s decision making on foreign policy. I am not sure on the EU`s foreign policy on 
Zimbabwe but generally I think the EU is normative in nature. I mean that rational 
norms override material interests in terms of a clash. Yes the EU can have material 
interests but if they collide with its norms, in most cases it is her norms that prevail. The 
norms are the policy of promoting human rights and democracy both within and 
outside the member states. There might be need for more research on to what 
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extend norms and self interests affect the EU`s foreign policy maybe in relation to 
Africa and so forth. 
Riddervold indicated that she was interested in discussing EU foreign policy in general 
and was not an expert on Zimbabwe in particular. Despite this, her comments were 
insightful. From this discussion it can be noted that one cannot simply argue that the 
EU has motives that have material interests. It is agreeable based from interviews 
quoted elsewhere in this book as well as from secondary data that the EU is an entity 
that has genuine desires to promote democracy and human rights as a foreign policy 
tool. What Riddervold indicated was that rational norms aimed at promoting human 
rights are a key part of the Union`s motives in foreign policy. In the case of Zimbabwe 
it might be acceptable that the motives of the EU are intended to promote democracy 
first and then reap then material self interests when the democracy matures. Indeed it 
is a complex argument mirrored in realism versus liberalism. Liberalists argue that the 
EU promotes first and foremost human rights whilst the realists argue for the 
promotion of self interests by the block. It seems the EU goes for both in the case of 
Zimbabwe. 
 Foreign Policy differences within EU member states- A question of 
national interests? 
As of now the EU is composed of 27 member states and the list is expected to grow in 
the immediate and medium terms. Such a massive number of member states has also 
meant that the EU`s foreign and human rights policy towards Zimbabwe has been 
diluted despite all the vigorous attempts to present a single policy. In the recent past or 
recent decade there has been a clear division in some key nations in the EU on their 
approach towards the situation in Zimbabwe. The governments of the United 
Kingdom, France, Portugal and to some extent Germany and Denmark have been at 
diplomatic loggerheads due to policy differences on Zimbabwe. Their policy 
differences have given a clear lesson on the self interested geopolitical motives of the 
EU towards the country. Whilst the United Kingdom under Tony Blair (rivaled by 
Australia`s John Howard) was the most hostile regime towards Zimbabwe since her 
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independence in 1980, the Chirac government in France was looking for an 
opportunity to swallow Zimbabwe into her geopolitical colonial style spheres of 
influence. Whilst the United Kingdom was campaigning to have the EU to support her 
tougher stance to isolate Zimbabwe, France was presenting herself to Zimbabwe as a 
reasonable broker in an attempt to push out the UK and paving the way for French 
influence. With the passage of time German and Denmark became tougher after some 
farms they claimed to be belonging to their nationals were reportedly seized by the 
authorities in Zimbabwe as part of the land reform programme. These two nations 
upped the stakes and threatened to sue Zimbabwe in international courts. This was 
probably good news to the UK as it helped the UK to have more allies to tighten the 
screws on Zimbabwe. The 2007 EU-Africa summit was delayed and almost cancelled 
over policy differences within the EU on Zimbabwe. Whilst the whole of Africa was 
united in saying that they will not attend the summit if Zimbabwe was not represented 
at the highest level, the EU was divided. Portugal as the host supported by the EU 
Commission President, Jose Manuel Barosso was in favor of the Zimbabwe 
President`s attendance. For its part, Portugal might have been interested in being 
successful during its term holding the EU presidency by hosting the EU-Africa 
summit. The Independent newspaper in the UK quoted Barosso as saying that "If 
international leaders decided not to go to those conferences involving countries which 
do not have reasonable human rights records, I'm afraid we would not be attending 
many conferences at all." (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/barroso-
defends-decision-to-invite-mugabe-to-conference-763585.html ). In the end the UK 
leadership boycotted the conference and posted a low level delegation. These lessons 
help in understanding the loopholes within the EU foreign and human rights policy on 
Zimbabwe. Such differences also strengthen the view that the EU is on the other hand 
composed of members not interested in pushing human rights and democratic 
tendencies in the world. Rather in a reasonable number of cases the EU member states 
have strong motivations to promote self interests in Zimbabwe and thus promote their 
long term political and economic returns whether human rights exist or not. The fact 
that the United Kingdom was beginning to mobilize the EU to sanction Zimbabwe 
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after the land repossession fiasco shows her interests in maintaining economic 
manipulation in Zimbabwe. The government of the UK never pressurized the 
government of Zimbabwe to speed up land reform since 1980 so that millions of 
landless rural peasants could realize their right to a dignified life with access to arable 
land and good harvests. The French interests in dispossessing UK of her influence in 
Zimbabwe were hardly the need to promote human rights and democracy. Rather both 
nations seemed to front their exploitative agenda for natural resources in Zimbabwe as 
Africa in general becomes the last frontier. Thus Andrew Mold and Sheila Page have 
noted that one concern to be raised now is precisely that in its dealings with 
developing countries the EU maybe moving towards a limited, business-like and 
mercantalistic approach, more akin to the USA model. (Mold A and Page S: 2007:19). 
In such cases like in Zimbabwe, the EU will erode its traditional soft power heritage 
which it badly needs to change situations in the developing nations.  
More on the Complexities of the EU Motives in Zimbabwe: 
An interview with one informant who was an active member of the Zimbabwe 
National Students Union whilst he was studying at the University of Zimbabwe helps 
in further understanding the complexities of understanding the motives of the EU in 
Zimbabwe. Victor Chimhutu was a student activist in the Zimbabwe National Students 
Union between 2000 and 2006. He studied a Psychology and Public Administration at 
the University of Zimbabwe and is currently studying for a Master in Gender in 
Development at the University of Bergen in Norway. The interview was conducted via 
email. I send him the questions on email on 17 April 2010 and he responded on 27 
April 2010. I quote him at length as his views seem to be touching on some of the 
complexities on the human rights relations between the EU and Zimbabwe. He had 
this to say: 
 Question: What do you think are the negative and positive motives of the EU `s 
human rights policies towards Zimbabwe? 
Victor Chimhutu: The history and context of the struggle of Zimbabwe ties it closely to 
the European Union. The most powerful nations in EU are basically the former masters 
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of many African economies; as such their intentions are always debatable. We have 
reached a point in history when destiny should be defined and not given. The 
blatant human rights abuses by the current regime in Zimbabwe especially from 2000 
onwards is undeniable, in fact as part of the student leaders, I have braved this 
brutality not because it was easy but it was to be done. If a father fails to protect 
and provide, strangers will find their way in the house. The motives of such EU 
interventions always lead to unintended consequences detrimental to the local 
population, governance and growth. EU is not a neutral benefactor in the 
Zimbabwean issue and certainly Britain isn’t. The dilemma we always face is of 
choosing. More often than not we choose the lesser and distant evil. Activism in 
Zimbabwe is defined by more or less one agenda; our inspirational figures and songs 
for the struggle are more or less the same across the (political) divide. Hence we 
adore Che Guevera, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Steve Biko,Julius Nyerere, 
Kwame Nkrumah, and Alfred Nikita Mangena and we all wish to defeat the neo-
liberal agenda for a more sensitive and inclusive system. In short we cannot deny the 
self-serving bias of the EU`s Human Rights policies on Zimbabwe. The policies ignore 
fundamental Human Rights of survival and justice and reinforce the predominance 
of a small proportion of the population. To me Mugabe has always adored socialism 
and a one party-state since the 1980s, what is different now is what he is aiming at 
and what he is challenging. Land and power structures? 
Such are views from the youth and active human rights activists from Zimbabwe. 
Chimhutu`s response is self explanatory. He reinforces one of the views that the EU is 
acceptable as a mediator in Zimbabwe because of its power and because it is a lesser 
threat than the current administration which thwarts basic and civilian human rights 
aspiration in almost every circumstance. He also touches on the issue this paper has 
defined as defining the nation of Zimbabwe, which is the land issue. If the EU is seen 
as vigorously responding to the situation in order to defend the interests of supposed 
former land owners who have been dispossessed, then the neutrality of the Union will 
be eroded. In the end the EU might gain in the short term when the people in 
Zimbabwe want its help for economic recovery but in the long term if the land issue is 
not resolved the country will be back to square zero and the well intentioned or hidden 
motives of the EU will be displaced as what has happened in today`s Zimbabwe. 
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Again as can be noted from Chimhutu`s response the EU`s  policy directions have led 
to some detrimentally unintended consequences against the civilian population. It 
might be today that the general people will think of the EU as a helper but when the 
dust settles many will pose and look back at what exactly where the motives of the EU 
in Zimbabwe. The significance of the European Union in Zimbabwe is well cherished. 
It is only up to the Union to do what an interviewee called Marianne Riddervold said: 
which is that the EU`s decisions should be based more on rational norms to promote 
human rights than on material interests.  
Summary 
To claim that the European Union`s human rights policy on Zimbabwe is driven 
purely by realism based explanations misses the point. Neither can one say the EU`s 
policy is purely based on liberal notions of the genuine interest to promote human 
rights in Zimbabwe. In fact this research found out that the EU is driven by both 
realistic and liberalistic democratic intentions in its human rights dealings with 
Zimbabwe. This research confirms that the EU has strong motivations to promote 
genuine human rights in Zimbabwe in as much as it has strong motivations to promote 
and defend its self interests manifested through economic investments and political 
interventions in Zimbabwe. As such the challenge is upon the Union to move in the 
direction which it claims to be going: which is to lean stronger on rational founding 
principles of the Union based on the genuine promotion of democracy and human 
rights in developing nations like Zimbabwe. By so doing the Union will have the 
potential to expand its global influence as more and more people might increase the 
belief that the Union is a neutral actor in international human rights affairs.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Norway’s Zimbabwe Human Rights Policy: Spreading Morality? 
What does Norway want in Zimbabwe? What are the motives of this self proclaimed 
humanitarian superpower? How do her policies differ or mirror those of the EU? 
 
Aiming to discuss the foreign and human rights policy motives of Norway is what this 
chapter intends to do. The discussion will attempt to dwell on foreign policy tools like 
the sanctions policy of Norway, the collaboration with Civil Society Organizations or 
NGOs, and the question of values and morals in international political relations of 
Norway towards Zimbabwe. The discussion will be framed within the context of the 
theories of international realism and rational or normative theories which proposes the 
position of moral and liberal values in a state`s international relations. The 
Zimbabwean government’s denial of the deterioration of the human rights situation in 
the country will also be deliberated within the context of its relations with Norway. 
Despite not having been a significant trading partner of Zimbabwe, it will be argued 
that Norway has long-term economic and strategic interests that it wants to gain in 
Zimbabwe and hence its decision to increase its influence in the country. Furthermore 
the work will explore the possibility that just as the EU, Norway is out there in 
Zimbabwe to pursue her self interests aimed at achieving hegemony and dominance as 
well as to secure places for future resource exploitation as the wave of globalization 
heats up. No one wants to be left behind. The paper will however not be blind to the 
possibilities that Norway sees Zimbabwe as a platform to advance her values of 
democracy, fairness and justice. Similarly this section will discuss the efficacy of the 
argument that Norway`s motives in Zimbabwe are also tailored towards building the 
image of Norway as a peace and humanitarian superpower on the global stage.  An 
interview with a former Norwegian Prime Minister will be presented and some of his 
views will be used in discussing different sections of the issues raised above.  In 
addition some aspects of the Norwegian policies will be compared with those of the 
European Union.  
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The diagram below is a summary of the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy 
instruments towards Zimbabwe. These points will be expanded in the analytical 
discussion that follows.  
 
Diagram 4a. Variables in Norwegian Foreign and human rights policy choices on 
Zimbabwe as will be discussed below.   
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My interview with Kjell Magne Bondevik on Norway’s Human Rights Policy on 
Zimbabwe. 
Mr. Bondevik was the Prime Minister of Norway from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 
2005. He is the longest serving non-Socialist Prime Minister in Norway since 1945. 
He is now the President of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which is 
located in Norway. I scheduled an interview with Mr. Bondevik via Tone Holme who 
is the Administrative Secretary at the Oslo Center. The interview took place on 25 
March 2010 at the main Oslo Center offices. 
 
Question: Mr. Prime Minister, Is Norway Promoting Self Interests in its 
Zimbabwe Human Rights Policy?  
Kjell Magne Bondevik:  I recall that i started fighting for Zimbabwe’s 
development before her independence in 1980. Zimbabwe was ruled 
by Ian Smith and i remember that people were suffering there. The 
system of Ian Smith was almost the same as apartheid in South Africa. 
During my days as a youth leader in my political party, the Christian 
Peoples Party ( Kristelige Folkelige Parti- KrF in the 1970s) i used to 
campaign for measures to support the liberation of Zimbabwe even if 
the Norwegian government during those years was not yet fully 
preoccupied with that issue as it was gaining momentum.  We 
cooperated with the liberation movements in Zimbabwe to help them. 
We supported Robert Mugabe til independence and we had sympathy 
for him and the country but as time went on we saw that he was 
becoming a dictator.  It was very sad. 
The government in Zimbabwe became more and more dictatorial. They 
disregarded the respect for human rights. The opposition political 
parties became victims of attacks. Elections were being rigged and the 
economy was being mismanaged. We in Norway have solidarity with 
the people of Zimbabwe today but not with Robert Mugabe. We think 
that Mugabe should accept democracy. There are rampant human 
rights abuses, no media freedom, and no space for NGOs and we know 
there is dispute on land.  
Question: So does it mean that Norway is promoting its self interests? 
Kjell Magne Bondevik: Not at all. No. We are engaging in Zimbabwe for 
sympathy. We have sympathy with the people of Zimbabwe. We think 
they deserve freedom and realization of their democratic rights. We 
helped to fight Ian Smith and we are still interested in helping 
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Zimbabweans. It is positive that Morgan Tsvangirai became the Prime 
Minister and it brings hope that maybe he might be able to rebuild the 
country and strengthen democracy.  
 
Question: Is Norway`s human rights approach to Zimbabwe based on 
genuine belief in human rights and freedom ideals or something else? 
Kjell Magne Bondevik:  Norway has a genuine belief in human rights. 
Human rights are universal. Norway implements the human rights laws of 
the United Nations and this means that we have genuine belief for such 
principles. Norway is a country which fights for human rights. We 
depend on dialogue. 
 
Question: What can Norway do to help in building democracy in 
Zimbabwe? 
Kjell Magne Bondevik: We have to work with the government. We have 
to try to influence Robert Mugabe to have free and fair elections. We 
have to support Tsvangirai and Mugabe based on conditions that will 
bring democracy. Institutions that strengthen democracy should be 
built. There is need to support measures to have a strong judiciary, 
NGOs and parliament. Norway should support human rights dialogue 
with Zimbabwean government and the NGOs. We can offer 
development assistance on condition that it reaches the people. 
Corruption is an issue of major concern though. It is tragic that Robert 
Mugabe mismanages the resources of the country. We think 
neighboring countries especially South Africa can help on the situation 
in Zimbabwe.  
 
 Such was a brief of the interview i had with the former Norwegian Prime Minister at 
his new offices at the current Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which is 
located in Oslo. There are many insights that can be learnt from what Bondevik said in 
relation to the motives of Norway in Zimbabwe. The tone sounded like Norway has 
genuine belief in helping the advancement of democracy in Zimbabwe. Chronicling 
the historical support that Norway gave in the fight for independence in Zimbabwe is 
something that many organizations have been quick to point out as a justification that 
the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy is aimed at purely helping peoples of 
the less developed nations and in this case Zimbabwe. Dismissing such assertions is a 
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challenge since it is known that Norway and most Scandinavian nations were 
instrumental in the supporting liberation movements in Zimbabwe. They offered moral 
support and sometimes temporary sanctuary to some independence fighters. If such 
arguments are to go by, then it will be hard for critics to ignore the Norwegian appeal 
that they are interested in genuine human rights development in Zimbabwe.  
 
The Interview below was with a former student activist in Zimbabwe, Victor 
Chimhutu (who was introduced earlier in Chapter 3). He presents some points which 
mirrors and differs from those of the former Prime Minister.  
 
Interview with Victor Chimhutu on Norwegian human rights policy motives 
towards Zimbabwe 
Question: What do you think are the negative and positive motives of 
the EU and Norwegian human rights policies towards Zimbabwe? 
Victor Chimhutu: Norway benefits from a system that undermines the 
fundamental rights of humanity. I don’t know whether what is right for 
humanity is defined as human rights. I mean to say that, the world 
order, trade relations are skewed and are probably something that we 
can’t deal with over a cup of coffee. The dividends from the hegemony 
mean a lot for Norway, its economy and its relations with other 
countries. As a single entity however, it is very difficult to see the 
cynicism in Norway’s Human Rights policies towards Zimbabwe. 
Just like Bondevik, Victor acknowledged the difficulty of seeing Norway as selfish in 
its dealings with Zimbabwe. Victor sees Norway as benefiting from a hegemonic 
system set up by other stronger powers over Zimbabwe. In other words he believes 
that stronger powers in the EU dominate Zimbabwe`s economy and politics. Norway 
just benefits from a system established by the bigger powers in Zimbabwe. As the 
discussion below unfolds, it will be noted that I argue that both these views have some 
validity.    
 
 
 
65 
 
Norway’s Sanctions Policy against Zimbabwe 
Norway has aligned herself with the EU regarding sanctions on Zimbabwe and as such 
her stance is difficult to separate from that of the EU. Just like the EU Norway sees her 
sanctions regime as targeted sanctions aimed at the military, individuals in the 
government and a freeze of assets of the individuals and companies thought to be 
benefiting the named individuals.  The Diagram below shows how Norway sees and 
defines the sanction she has placed on Zimbabwe.  
  
Diagram 4s: Norway sees her sanctions against Zimbabwe as targeted against the 
military and certain individuals in the Zimbabwe government.  
The table below is an extract from the Norwegian sanctions document on Zimbabwe. 
The table shows that Norway has drafted its sanctions as mainly targeted against 
institutions that repress human rights and democratic growth in Zimbabwe. In such a 
case the sanctions looks well meant and well drafted.  
FOR 2003-08-15 nr 1050: Forskrift om særlige tiltak mot Republikken Zimbabwe 
§ 3. Forbud mot salg mv. av våpen og relatert materiell  
       Det er forbudt å selge, levere, overføre eller eksportere, direkte eller indirekte, våpen og relatert materiell 
av enhver type, samt reservedeler til slikt materiell, til enhver fysisk eller juridisk person, enhet eller ethvert 
organ i, eller til bruk i, Republikken Zimbabwe. Forbudet gjelder uansett om varene har norsk opprinnelse eller 
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ikke.  
§ 6. Unntak fra § 3 til § 5 for utstyr ment for humanitær bruk mv.  
       Som unntak fra § 3 til § 5 kan Utenriksdepartementet tillate:  
a) salg, levering, overføring eller eksport av  
1. ikke-dødelig militært utstyr, eller utstyr som kan bli brukt til nasjonal undertrykking og som står 
oppført i vedlegg I, som utelukkende er ment for humanitær bruk eller beskyttelse eller for 
internasjonale programmer for institusjonsbygging,  
2. materiell ment for internasjonale krisehåndteringsoperasjoner;  
b) finansiering og finansieringsbistand samt faglig bistand i tilknytning til utstyr som nevnt i bokstav a, 
såfremt de samme betingelser er oppfylt.  
§ 7. Påbud om frysing og forbud mot å gjøre tilgjengelig midler mv.  
       Midler og økonomiske ressurser som tilhører de enkelte medlemmer av Republikken Zimbabwes regjering 
eller fysiske og juridiske personer, enheter og organer som har tilknytning til dem, som oppført på listen i 
vedlegg II til denne forskrift, skal fryses 
Source: www.Lovdata.no  
&3. Disallowing the sale of weapons and related material. 
It is illegal to sale, deliver, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, weapons and related material of any type, as 
well as repair parts of such material, to any physical or judicial person, entity, or organ in or for use in the 
Republic of Zimbabwe. The illegality is valid whether the products have or have not their origins in Norway.  
&6. Exceptions to &3 up to &5 for equipment meant for humanitarian use, etc. 
As an exception to &3 up to &5 the foreign ministry can allow: 
(a).Sale, delivery, transfer or export of 
1. Non-dangerous military equipment which can be used in national repression and which are in the annex 1, 
but which is meant for humanitarian use or protection or for international programs for institutional building 
2. Material meant for international crisis management operations.  
(b). financing and financial aid as well as aid related to equipment mentioned in letter (a) and the same 
conditions should be fulfilled. 
&7. Allowing freezing of assets and disallowing access to such assets. 
Assets and economic resources that belongs to some members of the government of Zimbabwe or physical and 
judicial persons, entities and organs which have connections to them as it stands on the list in Annex II in this 
declaration, shall be frozen.  
Source: www.Lovdata.no 
Table 4 s. this table was made with information from the sanctions law against Zimbabwe of Norway which can 
be found at www.lovdata.no  or in a book called Norges Lover (Norwegian Laws). The table is an extract of 
some paragraphs on sanctions against Zimbabwe imposed by Norway following the EU`s lead. 
The sanction language above is almost the same as the EU sanctions declaration on 
Zimbabwe. As discussed on the section on constraints to Norwegian foreign policy on 
Zimbabwe, the nature of the sanctions paper from Norway is an endorsement of the 
EU`s position on Zimbabwe. It is difficult to see how Norway can ignore the EU when 
it is so important to her foreign policy interests. As such the motive of Norway for 
adopting such sanctions on Zimbabwe could have been fronted by the need not to go 
against the EU`s foreign and security policy. As noted by the Norwegian mission to 
the EU, Norway is invited by the EU to align itself with some EU positions on foreign 
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and security policy issues. In this case Norway could have been fulfilling such a role. 
It is also difficult to see how Norwegian sanctions could have impacted Zimbabwe on 
their own without the combination of the EU sanctions. This is not to say that Norway 
does not matter to Zimbabwe. In fact it is because Zimbabwe has not been importing 
much weapons or related material from Norway and economically there has not been 
much trade between the two countries. However by imposing the sanctions Norway 
avoided being an alternative weapons import zone for the regime in Zimbabwe and 
that makes it significant that Norway adopted the EU measures. More so the 
imposition of sanctions by Norway offers a symbolic message to potential human 
rights violating nations that Norway will not be an accomplice or friend of wayward 
regimes. Norway`s sanctions on Zimbabwe are therefore significant in that way. And 
such motivations could have driven Norway to adopt sanctions as a human rights 
policy against Zimbabwe.  
In the discussion on the EU sanctions it was noted that despite labeling the sanctions 
as restrictive measures aimed at certain individuals, the sanctions have in reality hurt 
civilians and the economy of Zimbabwe. More over, the intended targets have not felt 
much of the sanctions effects except not visiting Norway and Europe. It is hard to see 
how banning a person from visiting Europe can make him/her suffer when the very 
same person continues to enrich him/herself. Zimbabwe has continued to import 
weapons from China, Russia, Iran, India, African countries, South Africa and Israel. 
The same capacity that Zimbabwe had in 1999 to suppress its people with weapons is 
the same capacity that it has today in 2010 and beyond. What is the argument here? 
The point is that sanctions as a policy do not always hurt the intended target. They hurt 
the ordinary people whether their name is “comprehensive”, “smart” or “targeted”. 
Cases of North Korea, Burma, Syria, Libya and many others prove the point. In those 
nations it was the ordinary people who suffered the most whilst their leaders were 
partying and merrying. In North Korea, Burma, Libya and Syria people have not 
started a war against their governments despite the long term sanctions imposed on 
those countries. In fact the sanctions have increased the justification by repressive 
regimes to punish anyone who goes against them on the pretext of punishing those 
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who collaborate with enemies of the state. Zimbabwe has not been an exception. Thus 
even if the Norwegian sanction policy had good intentions, its weaknesses are found in 
some of these reasons.  There is still growing debate on the workability of sanctions in 
the academic and policy circles. However the challenge is that sanctions have been a 
success in achieving what John Mearsheimer and Patrick Morgan noted when they 
said that “the essence of international politics is competition for power, with power 
consisting ultimately of coercive capabilities (P Morgan in Collins, 2007:19) and that 
“great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, 
with hegemony as their final goal” (Mearsheimer: 2001:29). Sanctions have made it 
possible for greater powers to maintain their dominance and stop any potential rivals 
from emerging as economically and politically stronger powers. It is however 
unfortunate that a regime like the one in Zimbabwe has allowed the greater powers to 
have a justification to impose sanctions because of its allowance of a rogue democracy 
and a meandered human rights system.  
  
Norway`s Civil Society Policy on Zimbabwe. 
Bondevik pointed with passion how he believes that NGOs have a role to play in 
development of democracy in Zimbabwe. As noted in the interview brief above, 
Bondevik pointed out that Norway needs dialogue with the government of Zimbabwe 
and with the NGOs in order to promote democracy in this nation. It is very important 
to note that in the Norwegian system there is very strong relationship between the state 
and the NGOs. They collaborate on foreign assistance and on some international 
humanitarian missions. In most cases Norwegian based NGOs offer immediate 
international assistance to countries in crisis. My brief experience as a worker at the 
Doctors Without Borders in Norway (Leger Uten Grenser Norge) also helped to 
understand the NGOs in Norway a little bit more than I knew before. The significance 
of NGO-state relations can somehow be capture by this press release from the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry: “The decision to increase humanitarian assistance to 
Zimbabwe happens on encouragement from the UN emergency coordinator. The aid is 
primarily targeted towards food security and it will be distributed via organizations 
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like the Red Cross, Norwegian Peoples Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the 
Children Norway, and Doctors Without Borders Norway. These are organizations that 
have a long engagement in Zimbabwe, and they have the competent channels needed 
to minimize the risk for misuse of the aid” (Foreign Ministry Press release number 
39/10) (Beslutningen om å øke den humanitære bistanden til Zimbabwe skjer på oppfordring fra FNs 
nødhjelpskoordinator. Bistanden er primært rettet mot matsikkerhet, og  går gjennom organisasjoner 
som Røde Kors, Norsk Folkehjelp, Flyktninghjelpen, Redd Barna og Leger uten grenser. Dette er 
organisasjoner som har et langsiktig engasjement i Zimbabwe, og som har rutiner for gjennomføring 
og overvåkningssystemer på plass for å minimere risikoen for misbruk (Utenriks Departementet: 
Pressemelding Nr. 39/10). In a foreign policy speech the Norwegian foreign Minister 
clearly stated that Norway has a policy to carry out its activities through the support of 
NGOs. Jonas Gahr Støre pointed out that “Norway will continue its efforts in 
Zimbabwe in close cooperation with the other Nordic countries. We are providing 
substantial support for humanitarian assistance, and in 2008 our contribution amounted 
to NOK 67.7 million. Norway is also supporting civil society actors in the country and 
in the region. (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). By pursuing such 
a policy it might be argued that Norway has real humanitarian based interests in 
Zimbabwe. It can also be argued that Norway has the motive to use Zimbabwe as a 
lever to reaffirm its belief in promoting global humanitarian assistance to countries in 
need. In this policy Norway also attempts to affirm the role of civil society in 
international development. Thus the motive of working through NGOs in Zimbabwe 
might just be a genuine belief by Norway that NGOs are an indispensible partner in 
development issues. Even inside Norway herself NGOs perform various functions like 
working against drug abuses, against child abuse, promote family cohesion and several 
economic, political and economic activities.  It is therefore a legitimate possibility that 
Norway has partnered with NGOs in pursuing its Zimbabwe policy solely in the belief 
that NGOs are a paramount development actor. Nevertheless Non- State Actors 
(NSAs) like NGOs have not been free from scrutiny of their independent motives vis a 
vis those of their home governments. 
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Globalization as a phenomenon has provided a chance for NGOs to attempt to be 
autonomous actors in international relations. Some NGOs have even demanded greater 
say than what countries in poorer nations have today. This is against a background 
whereby some NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have more 
financial muscles which are more than some governments in the developing world. 
NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and a host of others have 
been very critical of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. These NGOs positions 
have been supported by governments in the West like in Norway and the EU since 
their interests coincide regarding Zimbabwe. However it has been the level of hostility 
that the NGOs have exhibited against Zimbabwe that has called into question the 
motives of their alliances with the western governments. NGOs in Norway have been 
more vocal of events in Zimbabwe than they have been on their home government 
when it comes to immigration issues. Despite some shortcomings in the Norwegian 
immigration politics, the Norwegian NGOs have been moderately vocal against their 
government. When the NGOs in Norway criticize their government they rely on the 
moral conviction that their government will do the right thing. If the Norwegian 
government decides to ignore them and carry out a certain immigration policy, there is 
little that they can do to the government. However in relation to Zimbabwe and the 
generality of perceived dictator governments from the developing nations, these NGOs 
have been effective in using their alliance with their home governments. The NGOs 
have been effective in calling for sanctions against Zimbabwe and these sanctions have 
been successful in defeating what NGOs claim they want to achieve in Zimbabwe. The 
sanctions have led to economic decline and international isolation of Zimbabwe. If the 
purpose of the NGOs has been to create a humanitarian situation so that they can have 
more to do in Zimbabwe, then they might have been successful. Targeted sanctions are 
in theory a pragmatic idea, but in reality they do not produce the intended results. It 
will also be a long way to make people who matter to understand this position. This is 
because people from governments and NGOs who campaign for sanctions have not 
themselves been made to live under them and it is highly unlikely that they will 
experience any form of sanctions in the foreseeable future. This will therefore make it 
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difficult for such entities to understand that a sanctions policy is wholly immoral and 
defeats the course of development agendas. When the Wikileaks organization released 
some classified documents of the American government, it made the USA feel a bit of 
what it means to be infringed upon on matters of life and death (for both its military 
personnel and the general civilian population). Such damages or possibilities are what 
sanctions can do to a nation and its people. There is just need for a well thought out 
strategy before embarking on such decisions.  
The link between democracy, globalization and NGOs has also been summed up by an 
extract from Magnus Bjørnsen`s article. He noted that “In the face of globalization, 
African democracy faces two significant challenges. Firstly, a threat of what can be 
called “erosion from below”. The mistaken perception that democracy and good 
governance also imply a weak state, has led to a myriad of NGOs and other actors who 
can be classified “civil society” infringing on what has traditionally been seen as the 
state`s role, primarily in service delivery” (Magnus Bjørnsen :2008:93). This is a 
reality that has been happening in Zimbabwe. It seems the Norwegian government 
shares this misconception with the NGOs and hence the making of their alliance. The 
perception has been that Zimbabwe should show its democratic credentials by giving 
space to NGOs and other civil society actors. By refusing to do so the Zimbabwe 
administration has thus been labeled a pariah state. What is the motive of so doing by 
Norway and her NGOs? The possible motive can be that Norway has blinkered eyes 
which define a democracy as a country which mirrors the Norwegian thinking. It can 
be an attempt to force a western way of governance systems on Zimbabwe. The reality 
is that African states need democratically strong governments to maintain law and 
order. European governments were very strong and controlling of their populations til 
their development levels were such that people were more concerned with defending 
their newly won middle class status and freedom. When Europe developed to its 
current levels everyone understood the value of freedom and they did not want to lose 
it. As such countries like Zimbabwe need democratically strong governments as 
opposed to democratically weak governments which can collapse and thereby impede 
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the road to consolidated development. Norway`s policy towards Zimbabwe might 
therefore be missing this point.   
 
Norwegian Strategic Interests in Zimbabwe? 
Having an assertive and self interested foreign policy has been the norm in realist 
thinking and Norway has not been an exception in the game. John Mearsheimer argued 
that “great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their 
rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. The system is populated with great powers 
that have revisionist intentions at their core” (Mearsheimer: 2001:29). On a realist 
basis Patrick Morgan similarly argued that “the essence of international politics is 
competition for power” (Patrick Morgan in Collins, 2007:19). So who says that 
Norway has no realist intentions to gain power? Indeed there is no possibility to 
dismiss the argument that Norway has motives to gain ground in Zimbabwe and 
therefore expand her influence in Africa. As Mearsheimer and Patrick Morgan 
highlighted it is the intention of nation states to compete for power in the international 
political system. Some may argue that Norway is not a great power and hence it does 
not fit Measheimer`s category of great powers. This position does not hold sufficient 
strength since the notion of great power is absolute as well as relative. The absolute 
side is that it is generally accepted that the USA, China and Russia are great powers in 
the current international system. The relative side is that countries like the United 
Kingdom or France and Germany are greater powers as compared to countries like 
Portugal, Norway and The Netherlands. On a similar note Norway might see herself as 
a great power relative to most countries in Africa, Asia and some Latin American 
states. In this case her international politics towards Zimbabwe might be shaped by the 
thinking that she has the potential to fight it off for influence in Zimbabwe. Such a 
realist desire to expand her international influence in Africa through an assertive 
stance on human rights in Zimbabwe can be Norway`s attempt to compete for global 
hegemony.    
International diplomatic and political interventions in nations like Zimbabwe have not 
always been based on goodwill intentions by the western powers. To say that most of 
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the interventions by western nations in areas like Africa and Zimbabwe are purely 
humanitarian misses the reality. An argument by Hilde Frafjord Johnson assists in 
making sense of this argument. Hilde Johnson noted that “It is still fair to say that the 
engagement of the international community in Africa has largely been based on 
individual strategic interest, geo-political positioning, scramble for resources and 
power. Even progressive Nordic donor countries, Norway included, tied aid and set of 
returns from their assistance as an operational goal as late as the mid-nineties (Hilde 
Frafjord Johnson: 2008: 29). She further says that “Hardly any actors were engaged in 
Africa for Africa`s sake (Hilde Frafjord Johnson: 2008: 29). Thus as she noted Norway 
is part of the international competition for resources and dominance of the developing 
nations like Zimbabwe. Magnus Bjørnsen aligns to this position by admitting that “It is 
indeed true that several of the policy changes which can benefit Africa in the future 
should be motivated in our own long term interests, rather than as altruism or charity 
vis-avis the African continent (Magnus Bjørnsen: 2008: 95). The Norwegian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs weighed in by stating that “I believe we must have the courage to 
discuss our own interests in the world. We must learn more about how the various 
goals and needs of Norwegian society are challenged by globalization, and how they 
can best be met” (Jonas Gahr Støre: 2008: Foreword). It is therefore legitimate to think 
that despite the good intentions to the people of Zimbabwe; Norway has not been left 
behind in the process of the fight to gain resources of the country. The situation in 
Zimbabwe makes it difficult for countries like Norway to extract resources and to open 
new markets for their finished products. As such advocating a human rights policy 
which prefers a change from one government to another can hide suspicions of 
advancing her long term political and economic benefits.  
 
A country like Zimbabwe has been in an unfortunate position like many developing 
countries, whereby developed powers attempt to indirectly rule her by imposing their 
political will by any means necessary. This thinking is a continuation of the colonial 
era style in which nations like the United Kingdom and France treated African nations 
as pawns designed to fulfill their own interests. Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru noted 
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that “Africa`s current marginal position in the global economy must be placed in a 
historical context – i.e. its colonial past and the manner in which the continent was 
integrated into the post 1945 world order” (Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru 
:2008:98). With the wave of globalization taking place, nations like Norway have 
joined the race for resources and markets and thereby pursuing human rights as 
indirect ways to achieve the political goals. Nordberg and Cheru goes onto to say that 
“More than any other region in the world, Africa has paid a high price for the 
globalizing policies of rival capitalist powers as they strived to expand the geographic 
bounds of capital (Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru: 2008: 98 ). Nordberg and Cheru`s 
arguments are indeed critical in understanding the Norwegian motives in Zimbabwe. 
The intention by Norway to expand her geographic bounds of capital to Zimbabwe is a 
real possibility. Norway has money it needs to invest elsewhere and as such political 
control and transformations of countries like Zimbabwe offers long term possibilities 
to experiment such projects before finally securing such interests. It is no wonder 
therefore that the administration in Zimbabwe has been drumming up support locally 
and from African nations based on the campaign against the expansion of capitalism 
intended to devour Zimbabwe`s resources. This exposes the deficits of manipulating a 
good cause such as promoting human rights with promoting self interests of well off 
states like Norway.    
Trade, Aid, and Economics as Norwegian Human Rights Policies 
Significant economic trade between Norway and Zimbabwe has not been recorded 
though aid through NGOs and other government agencies like NORAD has been key 
in Norwegian foreign relations with Zimbabwe. Can it be said that Norway`s policies 
on Zimbabwe are based on advancing her economic interests in the country?  Such a 
proposition is challenging to sustain in historical terms since trade volumes between 
Norway and Zimbabwe have been low. However with the new wave of globalization it 
is within range to suspect that Norway`s foreign policy on Zimbabwe has the 
hallmarks of intending to gain long term economic and resource interests in 
Zimbabwe. Norway has not been shy in supporting a government which is an 
alternative to the post independence administration in Zimbabwe. Even though 
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Norway has mainly argued on the basis that it supports a government that promotes 
human rights and democracy, it cannot be dismissed that economic interests lie behind 
part of her policies towards Zimbabwe. 
 
 When Norway announced that she was interested in investing Zimbabwe in May 
2009, the news was greeted as welcome by the media and government in Zimbabwe. 
After Erik Solheim, the Norwegian Minister for International Development was one of 
the first senior western delegates to visit Zimbabwe in nearly a decade; a Norwegian 
investment team planned a visit to Harare. The investment team was from various 
stakeholders including the Norwegian Investment Fund (NORFUND) with its 
investment director being Kjartan Stigen, a former economist and counselor at the 
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Zimbabwe 
(http://allafrica.com/stories/200905181536.html).  However when the Harare 
government started to debate an indigenization bill for economic empowerment of the 
local population in businesses, the Norwegian investment delegation announced that 
they will not invest in Zimbabwe if such a bill was passed.  Despite the Indigenization 
bill`s shortcomings, the Norwegian position is a classic example whereby economic 
policies of the powerful nations are meant to expand their capitalistic hegemony in 
Africa on their own terms. Such action raises doubts about the real intentions of 
developed nations towards countries like Zimbabwe. It is agreeable that no entity 
would like to invest its funds were they will be misappropriated. At the same time it 
can be remembered that after Norway discovered oil, she quickly put compulsory 
measures to make sure that the oil will benefit Norwegians and not the big business 
empires from the USA or the United Kingdom. Norway`s actions regarding its oil 
resources are commendable. Norway has shown that a nation can develop by guarding 
its resources and making laws that ensure local ownership of the resources as was the 
case with her oil discoveries in the 1960s and 1970s. When Zimbabwe tries to do the 
same thing for its diamonds, mines and agricultural resources, a country like Norway 
strongly denounces it as dictatorial. What then are the motives behind such a policy? 
What then will make nations like Zimbabwe own their resources and thereby decide 
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their destiny? What can a nation like Zimbabwe do to challenge such tendencies from 
the international community of developed nations? Can Zimbabwe pursue a similar 
policy as it did in redressing the colonial origin land imbalances? Such questions are 
easy to answer. An agreement with developed nations like Norway that there is no 
option to Zimbabwe`s development except to let her own her resources and assist her 
with the technical requirements can lead to progressive development in the country. 
Such will be genuine development assistance as opposed to aid that makes recipients 
beg more and more. Under such circumstances it is a challenge to defend the 
impossibility that Norway has long term economic interests to pursue in Zimbabwe. It 
remains therefore a strong reason to believe that the long term strategy of Norway`s 
policy planners might be to gain a foothold in Zimbabwe at an early stage in the hope 
that it might provide the much needed resources in future as Africa becomes the last 
frontier.       
 
 Zimbabwe`s Denials and Interventions of International Norwegian Diplomats   
 
Norwegian interventions in Zimbabwe have taken various forms including both 
localized and internationalized channels. The situation in Zimbabwe has necessitated 
Norway to attempt to involve herself more in the country. However the dire political 
and economic conditions in the country were not being seen in the same light by 
Zimbabwe`s government and the Norwegian government. The two sides interpreted 
the situation in the country differently, maybe at least in public. A top Norwegian 
Diplomat, Jan Egeland, working as the United Nations Envoy for Humanitarian 
Affairs during the period when Zimbabwe embarked on a cleanup exercise called 
Operation Murambatsvina, summed up the thinking of the then Zimbabwean 
government. I attempted to have an interview with Mr. Jan Egeland but his 
communications secretary told me he was out on duty when I tried to schedule for a 
meeting and she gave me a copy of an article he wrote in the book entitled “A billion 
Lives”. A paragraph I quote from that article when Egeland talked to the President of 
Zimbabwe helps to show that the government in Zimbabwe was in a state of denial 
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regarding the degree of difficulties facing the country during that time. At the same 
time its shows that Norway`s Egeland saw things differently from Mugabe. This is 
what Jan Egeland had to say:   
“---- In an ante-room of the Presidential palace- I know this will be one of the most 
difficult missions and meetings ever. Nearly two years earlier my predecessor, Kenzo 
Oshima, a more polite and diplomatic envoy than I, had been kept waiting for hours in 
the presidential antechambers before being lectured for an hour about UN 
shortcomings. The UN is politicized Mugabe says because it is dominated by Britain 
and its stooges among whom I, a Norwegian, am soon accused of being one. "It is 
clear to us that the UN is being used by Britain for political purposes," he repeats. 
"That is why we are sensitive to your own presence." (Jan Egeland: 2008). 
Egeland goes on to note that: “There is a free fall in life expectancy from more than 60 
years in the early 1990s to between 30 and 40 today. The eviction campaign and the 
agricultural policies of the government have been "the worst possible things at the 
worst possible time" and have contributed to changing the country from being the 
breadbasket of the region with admirable standards of living to widespread starvation 
unless there is massive international assistance. (Jan Egeland: 2008). 
The Norwegian government`s recent view of the situation in Zimbabwe can be 
summed up with a statement from a speech on foreign policy by the Norwegian 
foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre: “Zimbabwe has been heading towards total 
collapse for a long time. Prime Minister Stoltenberg has, on behalf of Norway, 
repeatedly called on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
African Union (AU) to play a more active role in efforts to find a solution to the 
situation. We welcome the agreement to establish a unity government in Zimbabwe. 
But profound changes are needed in many of the country’s policies before a 
normalization of its relations with the international donor community can be expected” 
(Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb 2009). 
Egeland`s and Støre`s analysis of the situation in Zimbabwe as dire is and remains 
undeniable. It can be noted from what Egeland is saying that the government in 
Zimbabwe was concerned with shifting blame from itself and put it on the UN and the 
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UK. It is also undeniable that the United Kingdom has its own share of the burden in 
the dire economic, social and political situation in Zimbabwe. It is also an issue that 
many developing countries feel that the United Nations system needs a reformation. 
However it should be noted that by pointing out its frustration with the UN and the 
UK, the government of Zimbabwe was embarking on abrogation of its responsibilities 
on the deterioration in the country. It was an attempt to divert attention from the real 
problems on the ground and trying to attract sympathy from African and developing 
nations who might have similar thinking. Thus Egeland`s meeting with Mugabe helps 
in understanding the difficulties of engaging in a zone where the leaders deny their 
responsibilities. It could have been possible for the government in Zimbabwe to have 
refused to meet Egeland as the UN envoy. The expectation that as a Norwegian he 
might be less combative might have led them to accept a meeting with him. Norway 
has been successful in having her citizens serving as top diplomats in international 
organizations. There have also been attempts by Norway to use its citizens working in 
such positions to advance her interests as a peace builder and thereby expand her 
influences. Jan Egeland might have been one such individual in Norwegian policy 
interests and interventions in Zimbabwe.   
 
It is possible that if Jonas Gahr Støre`s position on Zimbabwe was that the country was 
heading towards a total collapse was true, then the pressure by Norway might be a 
genuine endeavor to raise attention to the situation in Zimbabwe and an attempt to 
prevent the collapse. If that is the case then the intention of Norway might be on the 
side of ordinary people who are experiencing the consequences of the decline in 
Zimbabwe.  Norway has also attempted to promote a way forward in Zimbabwe by 
actively being a member of a so-called “Friends of Zimbabwe” group which held its 
recent meeting in Oslo in June 2010. After the meeting the Norwegian foreign 
Ministry released a short statement noting that: “the meeting was successful in coming 
up with a resolution and there was agreement on a new multi donor support fund for 
Zimbabwe in collaboration with the African Development Bank” (Møtet lyktes i å 
komme fram til en samstemt erklæring, og det ble enighet om støtte til et nytt 
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flergiverfond for Zimbabwe i regi av Afrikabanken) ( Utenriks Departementet : Nyhet 
03.06.2010). This is just an example of how Norway has attempted to pressure for 
human development in Zimbabwe through various channels which she has access to. 
Her intentions might well be multifaceted including both genuine desire to help people 
in Zimbabwe or to spruce her image as a voice for justice and fairness.   
 
Zimbabwe - A Platform for Norwegian Moral Strategic Values? 
That moral and strategic values forms part of the Norwegian foreign and human rights 
policy towards Zimbabwe is a strong possibility. Advancing her moral and 
humanitarian thinking has been a critical part of Norwegian foreign policy though it 
has not been easy to dissect the dividing line between self interests and moral interests. 
Nils Butenschøn gives a helping insight on this thinking. Nils noted that “ There are 
variations of idealist conceptions which prescribe active foreign policy on behalf of 
universal moral standards of humanity and justice, Norway`s interests are best served 
if its policy contributes to peace and justice in the world, both within and outside its 
own region” (Nils A Butenschøn: 1997:13). On a morally sided note Magnus Bjørnsen 
also pointed out that “It is correct that there can be a Norwegian extended self-interest 
in a global policy which fights poverty” (Magnus Bjørnsen: 2008:95). If the 
Norwegian foreign policy can be seen as designed to promote international moral 
standards, then her involvement in Zimbabwe can be serving just that purpose.  
Norway has been pressing regional governments in Africa especially the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) to help in ending the political and 
humanitarian challenges in Zimbabwe. Other governments from the EU and elsewhere 
have been doing the same. However it seems Norway has more belief than the EU that 
SADC can be important in Zimbabwe in contrast to what the EU thinks. The EU is of 
the view that SADC is helpful only if it helps to arrive at an agreement which the EU 
likes. On the other hand Norway seems to have a position which is open and softer 
than the EU. However to make such distinctions is not always easy and it is therefore 
advisable to monitor the political developments as they unfold. Norway can be a 
bridging point on Zimbabwe`s relations with the western world if she uses the moral 
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and humanitarian card as she has done before in Sri Lanka and Palestine (Oslo 
Accords). Internal circumstances in Norway can also be an explanation for the moral 
motives in her foreign and human rights policy. 
 
A need to succumb to the values of her population might also be affecting Norwegian 
foreign policy. Norwegians have generally been seen as placing responsibility for their 
lives on their social democratic governmental system. The social welfare model in 
Norway might like to pay back its citizens by giving them an opportunity to influence 
foreign policy. The general public in Norway is seen not as advocating for a militant 
foreign policy. Their government might therefore want to carry the voice of its people. 
The foreign Minister of Norway captured this position when he noted that “I don’t 
think that there is anyone who will disagree with former Foreign Minister Knut 
Frydenlund`s thinking that “foreign policy is no longer a field for the few, for the 
experts and a small group of politicians. It affects everyone in their daily lives. 
Therefore, people must be given the opportunity to get involved in foreign policy 
decisions” (Jonas Gahr Støre: 2008 Foreword).  By being softer on Zimbabwe than  
the EU, the Norwegian government might be responding to the general mood of its 
population which favors dialogue. More so it should be noted that Norway`s 
achievements in foreign policy depend on a perception of her as peaceful from the 
outside world. It depends on sympathy given that the EU, NATO and USA strongly 
affect Norwegian options in international politics.  
Advocating a policy that minimizes escalation of tensions in Zimbabwe might explain 
the foreign policy motive of Norway of maintaining international peace and security. 
Norway`s survival depends on peace and stable security. Nils Butenschøn thus quoted 
an argument in her article which noted that “There is a more defensive orientation 
based on the idea that the best foreign policy a country like Norway can have is NOT 
to have a foreign policy at all, not to show too much in the landscape, because Norway 
is totally dependent on sympathy from the outside world. Norway should avoid 
conflict and if possible contribute to building bridges between adversaries who 
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otherwise could threaten Norway`s security, and to the establishment of an 
international legal order that protect small states” (Nils A Butenschøn: 1997:13).  It is 
therefore an indismissible probability that Norway`s policy regarding Zimbabwe is 
based on the desire to maintain international peace and security. To achieve this 
objective it is important that Norway actively promotes democracy and human rights 
in nations like Zimbabwe.  It might therefore be the reason why the current Norwegian 
policy is to support the coalition government in Zimbabwe today as expressed by a 
press release statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which noted that  “Norge 
støtter fortsatt samlingsregjeringen I Zimbabwe, men er bekymret over den ustabile 
situasjonen I landet. For Norge er det fortsatt viktig å støtte arbeidet med a sikre 
befolkningens demokratiske rettigheter, stanse politisk vold, styrke lovverk knyttet til 
menneskerettigheter og demokrati samt pressefrihet” (Norway`s still supports the 
coalition government in Zimbabwe, but it is worried about the prevailing unstable 
situation in the country. It is important to continue supporting the work to secure the 
people`s democratic rights, stop political violence, strengthen laws related to human 
rights and democracy as well as press freedoms) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Press 
release Nr. Unr/2010). Thus the Norwegian mission in Zimbabwe might be aimed at 
preventing deterioration in the country and thereby increase chances of a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict the country. Norway has invested a lot in trying to portray 
herself as a peace builder and as a champion of humanitarian undertakings. Zimbabwe 
might be one such chance for Norway to strengthen its endeavors of an image as a 
peace loving nation.  
Constraints on Norwegian foreign policy due to NATO, the USA and the 
EU`s Common Security Policy 
Norwegian interests are closely linked to developments in the North and our 
neighboring areas and they are safeguarded through transatlantic solidarity and our 
close integration with the EU and our Nordic and European partners (Jonas Gahr 
Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). This pronunciation from the Norwegian 
foreign Minister in a foreign policy speech in February 2009 nearly sums up the 
constraints to Norwegian foreign policy and consequently her human rights policy 
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towards Zimbabwe. As Jonas Gahr Støre noted, Norway`s interests can be influenced 
by the need not to antagonize ties with the various blocks like NATO, USA and EU. 
Støre went further to say that “the US is Norway`s most important ally” and that 
“NATO has been a cornerstone of Norway`s security policy since 1949” (Jonas Gahr 
Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). Under such circumstances it can be learnt 
that the Norwegian policy towards Zimbabwe operates within the need to maintain 
closer ties with NATO and the US as well as the EU. It should be noted that the 
sanctions policy of Norway towards Zimbabwe closely mirror those of the EU and the 
USA. The EU member states and the USA form the bulk of powerful deciders of 
issues in NATO, in which Norway is also a member. Thus if Norway fails to toil the 
lines wanted by the powerful USA and EU blocks then it will be very difficult to see 
how Norway expects help from these nations for its potential security dilemmas in 
case of a dispute with Russia in the North seas.  Norway also has to corporate on 
economic interests via the European Economic Area (EEA) and this poses probable 
challenges in pursuing an independent foreign policy towards Zimbabwe which is 
different from that of the EU. The Norwegian mission to the EU highlighted that 
“Norway is not part of the EU`s Common and Security Policy. However, Norway has 
regular political dialogues with the EU on various foreign policy issues and is 
regularly invited to align itself with EU foreign policy statements” (Norwegian 
Mission to the EU: July 2010). On a closely similar note the Norwegian foreign 
Minister pointed out that “the EEA Agreement and our broad cooperation with the EU 
are important ties for Norway as we meet the forces of globalization. One of Norway`s 
foreign policy priorities is to safeguard these ties at a time when the EU is both 
changing and being enlarged (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). 
What do these statements serve to explain? These public policy statements from the 
Norwegian foreign missions and ministry serves to highlight that Norway is not totally 
independent from the EU and NATO when making foreign policy preferences and this 
also applies to its Zimbabwe policy. It is difficult to see how Norway can force its way 
on taking a purely different position on Zimbabwe when big EU members like the 
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United Kingdom are totally against a softening of relations with Zimbabwe until 
conditions are what they wish them to look like.  
Despite the constraints to her foreign policy posed by USA, EU and NATO, Norway 
does not necessarily have to have the same views as those of these blocks. As the 
Norwegian foreign Minister noted “just as under the previous administration, our 
(Norway`s) interests will often coincide with those of the USA. But Norwegian views 
will occasionally differ from US views under Obama`s administration as well” (Jonas 
Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). This means that despite the pressure 
from other powerful allies of Norway, the Norwegian foreign policy will have some 
small space to air its different positions and views on certain policy issues. Such 
spaces are normally available if democracies of the same kind interact as is the case 
between Norway and these blocks.  Norway has thus been innovative in utilizing that 
limited gap to pursue different policy approaches towards Zimbabwe. This has for 
example seen Norway leaning more in favor of dialogue with Zimbabwe. Bondevik 
was clear in my interview with him that Norway depends on dialogue and that he 
hoped the situation in Zimbabwe will be resolved through an amicable dialogue 
between the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe.  
It can be noted therefore that the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy position 
on Zimbabwe can be motivated by the desire to keep strong ties with its EU, NATO 
and American allies. It can also be possible that Norway wants to identify with the 
values of its western allies and therefore she cannot be left behind whilst others agree 
on isolating Zimbabwe. Thus even if Norway was not interested in being too tough on 
Zimbabwe, it will be difficult to do that when she prioritizes her cornerstone relations 
with her ally groups. However despite the constraints, Norway has managed to 
diplomatically utilize the space available to relatively weaker nations by claiming her 
western democratic right to have independent views. This right has been difficult to 
argue against and as such Norway use this right to do things differently. Her efforts to 
champion humanitarian rights are part of the Norwegian strategies to force her views 
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on the agendas of the more realist and aggressive nations like the USA and semi 
aggressive blocks like the EU.  
Summary 
An approach which has seen Norway pursuing both self interests and moral values has 
been a key nature of the Norwegian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. This 
policy has seen the use of sanctions, aid, NGOs, international connections and other 
related tools in Norway`s relations with Zimbabwe. However despite having a 
sanctions policy motivated by the demands of the European Union, Norway has been 
able to portray itself as a nation that prefers to promote dialogue with Zimbabwe. This 
is an aspect that differentiate her from the more aggressive and tough stance of the EU 
on Zimbabwe.  However Norway`s policies are constrained by its relations and 
alliances with NATO, the EU and the USA. Such alliances have motivated Norway to 
follow these countries in some aspects of her Zimbabwe policy. Consequently some 
Norwegian positions on Zimbabwe have been motivated by the need to preserve her 
strong ties with the EU and to preserve her international political interests.  
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Conclusion  
Seeking a way forward 
Relational dilemmas between the EU and Zimbabwe have hopes in the dialogue 
mechanisms agreed to in the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP nations.  
In that agreement Zimbabwe and the EU can hope to mend their strained relations and 
in the process assist in rebuilding Zimbabwe.  Karin A. (2005:156) noted that “the 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, strongly aims 
to expand the phenomenon of political dialogue. Much more explicitly than before, the 
Cotonou Agreement posits political dialogue as a firm pillar of the ACP-EU 
partnership, alongside development assistance and economic trade relations (article 
2)”. It can thus be observed that this agreement offers possibilities for negotiations 
between parties in cases of disagreements. In such negotiations both parties should 
fulfill their obligations as agreed to in the deal. In this case it will need sustained 
efforts to achieve an agreeable understanding between the EU and Zimbabwe. In terms 
of achieving human rights and democracy standards, Zimbabwe is far from reaching 
that target. On a similar note the EU is far from offering the financial and technical aid 
it has been promising for far long a time.  So what can Zimbabwe do and what can the 
EU do? The European Union needs to engage with Zimbabwe with an open mind. The 
EU should stop dictating and expecting outcomes that only satisfy their position. 
Furthermore if the EU is seen to be advocating for policies that do not improve the 
general access to natural resources by the majority of the population in Zimbabwe, 
then its intentions will remain suspicious. In such cases the success of the EU will be 
hard to envisage.  Ignoring the centrality and urgency of the land politics in Zimbabwe 
will be at the peril of any efforts to solve the human rights and democracy deficits in 
Zimbabwe. Any agreements under the Cotonou dialogue processes should take into 
account the question of land reform, sustainable development, justice and equality in 
Zimbabwe. If the EU mainstreams these aspects, in addition to human rights and 
democracy, then chances are high that they will achieve a deal that will see Zimbabwe 
back on the positive development path again. On the part of Zimbabwe, what should 
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she do? Nordberg and Cheru provided some applicable advice to Zimbabwe. They 
noted that “those countries that can resist externally dictated solutions and implement 
independent development strategies are in a much better position to achieve 
development than those who cannot. The key to African countries in today`s world is 
to try to weave through the parameters set by the world economy and maintain as 
much independence or `policy space as possible. In the process, they would do well to 
support efforts aimed at seeing the current unjust international system in a more just 
direction” (Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru: 2008:105). This is a very important way 
forward for Zimbabwe. If Zimbabwe can achieve as much economic and political 
independence as possible from the EU and any foreign powers, then it can be in a 
better position to chart a progressive development path. By continuing to be 
economically dependent on the EU and other global capital enterprises, Zimbabwe will 
always fall down. If Zimbabwe remains in the armpits of the EU, then it will mean that 
the EU can open or close the levers of life in Zimbabwe whenever it views the 
situation as being unfavorable to her strategic interests.   
Norway- Zimbabwe relations can be improved through more bilateral engagements 
which can foster deeper understanding of the differences between their perspectives of 
the situation in Zimbabwe.  Norway is not part of the EU but she can use her closer 
relations with the EU to push for the EU to engage with Zimbabwe. If relations 
between EU and Zimbabwe improve, the same will translate to her relations with 
Zimbabwe. The Norwegian position which favors dialogue should be strengthened in 
relation to the situation in Zimbabwe. Financial and sustainable aid to Zimbabwe can 
be provided by both Norway and the EU in a way that does make Zimbabwe depended 
on them day in and day out. This means that aid should not be for one off events like 
food and one off vaccination programmes. Sustainable aid is that which will make the 
recipient nation liberated from future dependency. Thus Hilde F Johnson noted that 
“the international community must reform its approach to Africa. Delivering on aid 
commitments is important and building peace and building stronger states. Norway 
should play an important part in making that happen” (Hilde Frafjord Johnson: 2008: 
42). Building stronger states and building peace can only be achieved by committing 
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aid that makes nations economically and politically self reliant in future without 
burdening the tax payers from the developed nations. It is acknowledgeable that such 
positions are hard to achieve considering that in realist international relations greater 
powers always seek to dominate weaker nations and their rivals. It is therefore a 
challenge to see the EU and Norway subscribing to the idea of adopting a policy that 
will empower a country like Zimbabwe today since they think it might challenge their 
dominance tomorrow. However it should be noted that an economically prosperous 
Zimbabwe can become a vibrant democracy which can never pose a serious threat to 
other democracies like those in EU and Norway. The liberals have argued for such a 
position and if Zimbabwe is supported economically it will improve its human rights 
record and thereby become a friend of the European democracies for good. It will 
become the family of nations who strives to promote global values on democracy and 
human rights in future.      
Summarizing  
Consequences of the policies of the EU and Norway have been sometimes constructive 
and at times retrogressive to the human rights and development situation in Zimbabwe.  
Where the European Union and Norway have pursued self interested agendas to 
promote their political and economic interests, the effects have been negative on 
Zimbabwe as well as the EU and Norway themselves.  By imposing sanctions on 
Zimbabwe the EU and Norway have played a significant role in decaying the 
Zimbabwean economic, social and political development. The sanctions have led to 
the international isolation of Zimbabwe as well as to the freezing of all meaningful 
channels of international financial assistance. The government of Zimbabwe has 
exploited the imposition of sanctions as a political tool to argue that the EU is applying 
sanctions as a way of forcing Zimbabwe to surrender her natural resources to western 
imperial capitalism. This argument has been helpful in sustaining the rule of the 
government in Zimbabwe despite evident human rights abuses that have been 
witnessed under its tenure in office. Most nations from the developing continents, 
especially African nations have been resolute in defending Zimbabwe as a victim of 
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western realist and capitalist expansion agenda. As such the EU and Norwegian 
sanctions on Zimbabwe have been far from being successful despite their alleged 
intention to force an adherence to human rights standards in Zimbabwe. 
 Civil society organizations have been a key instrument of Norwegian and EU human 
rights policy towards Zimbabwe. It has been clear that these NGOs have been utilized 
by Norway and the EU to front their policy motives in Zimbabwe. The NGOs have 
been a cornerstone in offering humanitarian aid and in supporting local human rights 
groups in the country. They have also been busy exposing massive human rights 
abuses in Zimbabwe and thereby influencing policy directions from the EU and 
Norway. In their alliance with Norway and the EU to offer humanitarian aid and 
expose rights violations in Zimbabwe, the NGOs have been a success tool to promote 
the human rights and democratic ideals of the western societies. In so doing the 
motives of the EU and Norway can be understood to be a desire to partner NGOs and 
spreads their democratic ideals in Zimbabwe. Despite these noble motives it has also 
been noted that the EU-Norway-NGO partnership has some desires to maintain the 
European hegemony over Zimbabwe and thereby fulfill the realist philosophy of the 
desire to dominate weaker nations.  NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and the Crisis Group International have been key in advocating for the 
isolation and sanctioning of Zimbabwe. By so doing they have been a hand in pushing 
for the deterioration of living, economic, political and social standards in the country. 
Advocating for a tougher stance via isolation and sanctions contributed to increased 
brutality by the government of Zimbabwe against perceived enemies to its rule. In the 
ensuing battle it has been mostly civilians who suffered. As such it can be highlighted 
that the EU and Norway partnered NGOs to advance their motives to promote 
democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe in as much as they were using them to 
maintain and force their economic and political control of Zimbabwe. 
Economic and trade relations between EU-Norway and Zimbabwe have been part of 
the jigsaw puzzles that shaped the motives of the EU and Norway. In most cases it was 
noted that the EU has large investment firms and interests in Zimbabwe which they 
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have tried to protect by sanctioning Zimbabwe after perceiving her as a threat to its 
economic and strategic interests. Most of these investments have been in the 
agriculture, mining, industry, tourism and service sectors. By embarking on the land 
reform programme, Zimbabwe was seen as teaching a wrong lesson to other former 
African colonies with similar dilemmas. To safeguard their economic interests through 
Africa and former colonial nations, the EU member states imposed sanctions on 
Zimbabwe in response to a combination of both human rights violations and the land 
reform exercise. Arguably it was the land repossession programme which led the EU 
to take action against Zimbabwe. In such a case it can be argued that this policy was 
motivated by the desire to protect European political and economic interests in 
Zimbabwe more than it had to do with human rights issues. It can also be noted that 
the politics in the EU are also motivated by the desire to cover for each other in areas 
considered a member state`s sphere of influence. In this case the EU might have been 
assisting the United Kingdom to protect her long term economic interests in Zimbabwe 
in return for the UK`s mutual support to French, Portuguese or  Spanish foreign policy 
interests in similar cases elsewhere in the world.    
Norway has not been a key economic or trading partner with Zimbabwe. However this 
does not mean that she does not have economic interests in Zimbabwe. With the wave 
of globalization sweeping across the earth, Norway is trying to experiment expanding 
her economic wings into emerging and developing nations like Zimbabwe. Africa is 
seen as a center for future resource extraction and as such the battle is continuing to try 
to occupy areas of future exploitation. Zimbabwe is probably seen by Norway as such 
an area and it can be the reason why Norway has began sending some investment 
delegations to Zimbabwe to assess entry points into the potentially vast mining, 
agricultural, industry and banking sectors in the country.  
In many respects Norway and the EU`s policies on Zimbabwe have been similar. 
Aspects like sanctions, promoting genuine human rights and attempts to promote their 
moral and rational values in Zimbabwe have motivated both their foreign and human 
rights policies on Zimbabwe. However it has been noted that the Norwegian approach 
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has favored dialogue with Zimbabwe in resolving the human rights situation in 
Zimbabwe. The EU talks dialogue only on its own terms as opposed to Norway which 
sounds more open minded about the agenda for dialogue.  The Norwegian Minister for 
International Development was among the first senior western officials to visit 
Zimbabwe after the signing of the coalition agreement in the country. This was a 
strategy by Norway to pre-empt any attempts by the EU to reject the outcome of the 
coalition agreement. After Norway, and then Sweden went to meet the coalition 
partners in Zimbabwe, the EU was left with little option except to follow suit by 
sending a low level EU delegation after some months. It can thus be noted that the 
motives of Norway in Zimbabwe are, more than the EU, designed to promote stability 
and human development in Zimbabwe.   
That both Norway and the EU`s motivations in Zimbabwe forms part of their broader 
strategic economic and political interests is undeniable. It is also problematic to deny 
that both the EU and Norway view Zimbabwe as a platform to promote their western 
ideals of democracy, human rights, individual freedoms, the freedom of the media, and 
the notion of free and fair elections. The Zimbabwe of today as been found wanting on 
most of these ideals. As such intervention by nations like Norway and groupings like 
the EU are welcome when a government renegades on the responsibility to protect its 
citizens. When a government devours the citizens it is supposed to protect solely 
because they have a different political opinion, then the international community will 
be responsible if they don’t stop such abuses. The civil society too has a duty to 
expose and if possible employ powers within their means to stop human rights abuses. 
If the EU, Norway and the civil society organization’s interventions in Zimbabwe 
were to assume such responsibilities to protect after the failure of the government in 
Zimbabwe, then their efforts could have been cherished. In situations where nation 
states denounce human rights abuses only if their economic and political interests are 
threatened, then the motives and morality of so doing will remain a betrayal to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights upon which the United Nations system was 
created to protect so that people can enjoy peace, security, stability and their individual 
choices.    
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